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“. . . piρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ᾿ οὖν ἀpiιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώpiου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι·
κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι
εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσpiερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι
αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδένα.”
Σωκράτης
“. . . as I went away, I thought to myself, ‘I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really
knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not,
whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this













This thesis consists of three chapters which cover multiple fields in applied microeconomic
theory, such as behavioural industrial organisation (Chapter 1), contest theory (Chapters 2
and 3), political economy (Chapter 3) and optimal pricing (Chapters 1 and 3).
Particularly, in the first chapter, I study the role of loss-averse consumers’ expectations
about future consumption in the pricing policy of a monopolistic firm. Firm offers a contract
consisting of two units of service and consumer makes two sequential consumption choices:
buy first unit or not and if she buys first unit, buy second unit or not. Before signing the
contract, consumer forms expectations about consumption of second unit. I, first, study
consumer’s optimal consumption strategy. Then, I derive firm’s optimal pricing strategy for
each case of consumer’s expectations. Interestingly, if consumer expects to buy second unit
with high probability, firm finds it optimal to prevent her from buying it offering a three-part
tariff contract, namely, a fixed fee, first unit at a price below marginal cost and second unit
at a price above it.
In the second chapter, I study a two-stage contest with two players ex ante asymmetric
in abilities and a prize awarded at the second stage. At the first stage, players compete with
each other and the winner earns a lower effort cost at the second stage. Then, with the
second-stage effort costs having been allocated, the players compete again to win the final
award. I consider two cases of the first stage: simultaneous and sequential moves by the
players and find equilibrium efforts, expected payoffs as well as provide comparative static
results. The ex ante advantaged player will never be inactive, even if her opponent plays
first. Moreover, in equilibrium her equilibrium effort and expected payoff are always higher
than her opponent’s, regardless of the time she makes effort. I, also, endogenise the timing
of the players’ efforts and show that both players prefer sequential first stage with the weak
player exerting effort first.
Finally, the third chapter is an application of the model of the second chapter to a game
with two candidates and two interest groups. Groups offer two kinds of costly contributions
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to achieve political influence: a) pre-electoral campaign contributions to their favourite can-
didates that increase their probability of winning the election, and b) post-electoral lobbying
contributions to the winning candidate to affect the implemented policy. Candidates, in
turn, are the first to act by strategically choosing the lobbying prices they will charge the
groups once in office. I characterise the equilibrium values for lobbying prices, campaign, and
lobbying contributions and show that: a) candidates commit to charge a lower lobbying price
the group that supports them in the election, justifying the preferential treatment of certain
groups once in office, and b) less skilled candidates tend to promise a larger preferential
treatment to the group that supports them than more skilled candidates.
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Loss Aversion, Expectations and Optimal
Pricing
1.1 Introduction
Experimental evidence shows that not only do consumers assess economic outcomes accord-
ing to absolute measures but, also, they compare them to relevant reference points. The most
remarkable indication of such reference-dependent preferences is loss aversion, in the sense
that a loss-averse consumer is more sensitive to losses relative to her reference point than to
gains relative to it (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991). Reference-
dependent preferences are known to affect consumers’ behaviour and firms are aware of it
and decide their strategies accordingly (Blinder et al. 1998, Odean 1998, Genesove & Mayer
2001).
Typically, a consumer’s reference point in the money she has to pay in order to buy
a good could be either her status quo, how much she usually spends on this good or the
regular price of this good. In this study, instead, we consider a consumer similar to Kőszegi
& Rabin (2006) whose reference point is determined by her probabilistic beliefs about future
outcomes. However, while Kőszegi & Rabin (2006) consider a loss-averse consumer with
reference-dependent preferences facing a one-shot decision problem regarding the purchase
of a good, we assume that consumer’s reference-dependent preferences arise after she has
already consumed the good once and decides whether to consume again. In particular, we
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assume that before a consumer buys the good for the first time, she forms expectations about
her future behaviour given that she buys now.
To give some intuition, imagine that a customer of a mobile network provider wants
to decide whether to use data on her mobile phone in order to watch the first season of a
TV show. Consumer knows that if she decides to watch the first season, she will want to
watch the second season as well with some probability. If, for example, she expects to watch
the second season with certainty, doing so will be considered as a favourable outcome by
her, offering her some consumption utility, while not watching it will be perceived as a loss.
Nevertheless, although it is an undesirable outcome for her, consumer may also get positive
utility (gain-loss utility) even if she ends up not watching the second season. This positive
utility may arise in the case where consumer perceives not paying the price to buy data as
a gain in her total utility greater than the loss she feels for not watching the show.
After consumer has formed expectations about future consumption, we follow the timing
in Grubb (2015) in which a monopolistic firm offers a contract and consumer decides whether
to accept it or to choose her outside option which is normalised to zero. If she accepts, in the
first period, she learns her valuation of consuming a unit of service and makes a binary choice
deciding whether to buy first unit or not. If she does so, in the second period, consumer
learns her valuation of consuming an additional unit of service and decides whether to buy
second unit or not. Then, consumer makes the payment to the firm, which depends on the
number of units purchased and on the prices of the units.
We, first, find consumer’s valuation thresholds above which she decides to purchase. In
the second period, the optimal threshold depends on the price of the unit consumer considers
to buy, the level of loss aversion as well as her ex ante expectation about consumption in
this period. Actually, if consumer ex ante expects to buy second unit with sufficiently high
probability, she does buy it even if her valuation of this unit is lower than the price of it. In
contrast, if she ex ante expects to buy second unit with low probability, she does not buy it
even for some levels of valuation greater than the price of it. Regarding optimal first-period
threshold, it depends not only on the price of first unit but, also, on the price of the second
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unit, the expectation of second-period valuation, the level of loss aversion and consumer’s ex
ante expectation about second-period consumption. This happens because when consumer
decides whether to buy first unit, being forward-looking, she also takes into consideration
the probability of buying second unit which, in turn, depends on the price of it, her level of
loss aversion and the ex ante expectation of second-unit consumption.
Proceeding to study the pricing implications of such consumer’s preferences, we find that,
in equilibrium, depending on consumer’s ex ante expectation of buying, a profit-maximising
firm finds it optimal to deviate from a pricing strategy that involves extraction of consumer
surplus through a fixed fee and marginal cost pricing for each unit. Actually, if a consumer
ex ante expects to buy second unit with sufficiently low probability, firm finds it optimal to
distort prices charging for the first unit a price above its marginal cost and a price below it
for the second one. It acts so because since consumer’s ex ante expectation to buy second
unit is low, the probability of actually buying it is low as well. Thus, a profit-maximising
monopolistic firm finds it optimal to charge a price below marginal cost for the second unit
in order to raise the probability that consumer buys it and, hence, increase her perceived
surplus. In turn, to maximise expected profit and compensate for the second-period below
marginal cost pricing, firm finds it optimal to charge a price above marginal cost for the first
unit.
The optimal pricing strategy of the firm becomes even more interesting when consumer’s
ex ante expectation of buying second unit is sufficiently high. In this case, firm finds it
optimal to charge a price above marginal cost for the second unit. Firm, knowing that
consumer expects to buy second unit with high probability, finds it optimal to increase the
price of it so that to decrease the probability of buying it. This way, firm increases consumer’s
gain-loss utility in money dimension if she does not buy rather than her consumption utility
if she buys. In order to induce consumer buy first unit and, therefore, increase the probability
that she will experience an increase in her gain-loss utility in period 2, firm finds it optimal
to sell first unit at a price below marginal cost. Interestingly, if this marginal cost is zero,
which is the case, for instance, in mobile network providers where the cost of an additional
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minute or MB of data is zero, firm finds it optimal to offer first unit for free. This particular
type of contract consisting of a fixed fee, an allowance of units for which marginal price is
zero, and a positive marginal price for subsequent units beyond the allowance is known as
three-part tariff and is common in several markets such as mobile phone service, electricity,
health care and debit-card transactions.
Standard non-linear pricing models have not been able to explain such pricing schemes
with increasing marginal prices. Instead, they predict that prices should be decreasing rather
than increasing (Mussa & Rosen 1978, Maskin & Riley 1984). Moreover, consideration of
consumer with biased beliefs such as naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting for leisure goods
(DellaVigna & Malmendier 2004), myopia (Gabaix & Laibson 2006, Miao 2010) and self-
control naivety (Esteban et al. 2007, Heidhues & Koszegi 2010) can explain marginal prices
above marginal cost but cannot explain marginal prices below it for low levels of consumption.
Also, hyperbolic discounting for investment goods can provide an explanation for marginal
pricing below marginal cost but not for marginal pricing above it (DellaVigna & Malmendier
2004).
A number of studies that explain the introduction of three-part tariffs are the follow-
ing. Grubb (2009) shows that it is optimal for a firm to offer three-part tariff contracts if
consumers are overconfident, in the sense that they make two mistakes: overestimate the
probability of consuming initial units and underestimate the probability of extremely high
usage. Eliaz & Spiegler (2006) study a screening model with dynamically inconsistent prefer-
ences who differ in their degree of their ability to predict the change in their future changes.
They find that the optimal menu of contracts offered by the principal can be implemented
by a menu of three-part tariffs and not by a menu of two-part tariffs. Grubb (2015) considers
consumers who are inattentive, in the sense that they do not keep track of their past usage
of service. For example, a mobile phone user might not realise that she has exceeded her free
allowance of data and, therefore, does not know that surfing the internet is now charged at a
high rate. Again, in order for three-part tariff scheme to be optimal for the firm, consumer
has to make the two mistakes mentioned above. Finally, in a recent study, Triviza (2019)
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considers a consumer who is habit-forming—her current consumption increases her value of
future consumption. She shows that if consumer is naive habit-forming, namely, she realises
that she is habit-forming only if she has already consumed, three-part tariff is optimal for
the firm. Still, for this price scheme to be optimal, consumer is assumed to make one mistake
which is underestimation of the likelihood of future consumption.
In all the above cases, the common assumption that gives rise to three-part tariffs is that
consumers have a systematic bias in predicting their future preferences, while firms do not.
In the first study, consumers underestimate the variance of the future demand while the
firm knows the actual one. In the second study, principal knows the agent’s future utility
while the agent is partially aware of her changing tastes. In the last two studies, consumers
update their planned future behaviour after they have consumed. As a consequence, despite
the fact that firms ex ante know the “true” expected consumer surplus, they cannot extract
it all since consumers believe that their expected surplus is different to the “true” one.
In this study, we show that a three-part tariff pricing scheme can be optimal for a firm
even if there is not asymmetric information between the consumer and itself about consumer’s
expected utility and consumer stays consistent to her ex ante planned consumption strategy.
Furthermore, in contrast to the above studies where firm knows consumer’s “true” expected
utility but consumer has a misperception about it and learns the “true” one when she has
already consumed, in our case, while consumer and firm have different perception about
consumer’s expected utility, it is this utility they both take into consideration when they
search for optimal consumption and pricing strategy, respectively. Also, unlike in other
studies, our consumer does not update her strategy when she has already consumed and has
to decide whether to consume more or not. Finally, while the above studies suggest that firm
sells the second unit expensively because consumers eventually become willing to pay the
high price and acquire it, in this paper, we propose that if firm faces consumers with high
expectations of buying second unit, it sells it at a high price to prevent them from buying
and, as a consequence, feel their perceived utility increased because of the increase in their
gain-loss utility.
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There is a growing literature considering interaction between loss-averse consumers and
rational firms. For instance, Heidhues & Kőszegi (2004) consider a model with a monopolistic
firm and consumers who assess paying high prices as a loss compared to lower possible prices.
They show that even when marginal costs are continuously distributed, firm does not change
the price it charges for most small cost changes, result that interpret as price stickiness. In a
“cover version” of that model, Spiegler (2012) assumes that consumer has a single reference
point in price and he shows that expected price charged by firms are lower than in the case
without loss-averse consumers, a result also present in Heidhues & Kőszegi (2008) in an
oligopolistic setting.1
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the model.
In Section 1.3, we solve the model and provide the results regarding consumer’s optimal
behaviour and firm’s optimal pricing strategy. In Section 1.4, we graphically illustrate our
findings assuming uniform distribution. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes the paper.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Timing
Following Grubb (2015), we consider a two-period model, with one consumer and one firm.
Consumer’s available consumption choices are to buy a unit of service in period 1 and if she
does so, to also buy an additional unit of service in period 2.2
Before the game starts, consumer forms expectations about consumption in period 2
which are common knowledge between the firm and the consumer. After these expectations
have been formed, consumer and firm learn the distribution of consumer’s valuation of the
service and firm offers a contract p = {p0, p1, p2} , where p0 is a fixed fee, p1 is the price of
1See also Popescu & Yaozhong (2007), Karle & Peitz (2014) and Karle & Möller (2020) who study the
interaction between firms and loss-averse consumers in different settings.
2The main interest of the paper is focused on the case where the decision about purchase in both period
1 and period 2 is involved. Therefore, we omit the case where consumer can buy first unit in period 2. This
assumption makes our model less complicated and the results more elegant while not significantly affecting
them.
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first unit and p2 the price of second unit of service.
3 If consumer accepts the contract, she
pays the fixed fee, p0. Otherwise, she chooses the outside option which is normalised to zero.
If consumer accepts the contract, the timing of the game is shown in Figure 1.1. Denote
by kt ∈ {0, 1} consumer’s choice of buying one unit of service in period t, which is equal to
zero if she does not buy and equal to one if she does. In period t = {1, 2} , consumer learns
her valuation of service, vt. More specifically, at t = 1, consumer learns v1. Then, she makes
a binary purchase decision: either to pay p1 and purchase a unit of service (k1 = 1) or not
(k1 = 0). If she chooses not to buy in period 1, consumer gains zero utility and the game
ends. If she chooses to buy, consumer moves to period 2 where she learns the valuation of
an additional unit of service, v2, and chooses whether to purchase (k2 = 1) or not (k2 = 0).
t = 0
Consumer accepts con-





whether to pay p1 and
buy one unit (k1 = 1) or





whether to pay p2 and
buy second unit (k2 = 1)
or not (k2 = 0).
Consumer makes pay-
ment to the firm.
Figure 1.1: Timing of the game
1.2.2 Consumer’s utility
We assume that consumer has no ex ante expectations about consumption of first unit.4
However, she does have ex ante expectations about consuming second unit of service. For
instance, if consumer ex ante expects to consume second unit of service, then, doing so is
considered by her as a favourable outcome while if she expects not to consume it, in this
case, not consuming it is the favourable outcome.
3Since first and second unit can only be bought in period 1 and 2 respectively, we could equivalently
consider pt to be the price of a unit of service in period t.
4The main results of the paper can be obtained even if we consider expectations about consumption of
first unit as well. However, for simplicity, we assume that consumer behaves as an expected utility maximiser
in period 1.
7
To formalise our model, since consumer has no expectations about consumption of first
unit, her utility of consuming first unit is simply the difference between her valuation of the
unit in period 1 minus the price of the unit, v1 − p1, where vt is the valuation of a unit
of service in period t, drawn independently with cumulative distribution function F, with
support on [0, 1] and probability density function f.
Now, if consumer purchases in period 1 (k1 = 1) and her ex ante expectation was to
buy second unit of service with probability q, we derive her period 2 utility from Kőszegi &
Rabin (2006). Thus, if the price of second unit is p2, consumer’s net utility of buying it is
v2 − p2 + (1− q) (v2 − λp2) . (1.1)
The term v2−p2 is consumption utility from buying. The remaining term is gain-loss utility
from comparing buying to not buying. Thus, if, for instance, q = 1, i.e., consumer ex ante
expected to buy second unit with certainty, her utility from buying it is only the consumption
utility, v2−p2. On the other hand, if q = 0, i.e., consumer ex ante expected not to buy second
unit with certainty, her utility is the consumption utility plus the gain-loss utility which is
assessed as a gain in the value of the second unit of service, v2, and a foregone gain in the
price of it, p2, which because of the assumption of loss aversion is multiplied by λ > 1.
If, now, consumer does not buy second unit, in contrast to a non-loss-averse consumer
who earns zero utility, our consumer’s net utility is
q (p2 − λv2) . (1.2)
Relative to the expectation to buy, not buying is a gain of p2 and a loss of v2. For example,
if consumer ex ante expects to buy second unit with certainty, not buying it and, therefore,
not paying p2, is considered as a gain in the money dimension and a loss in the service
dimension. If consumer ex ante expects not to buy second unit, not doing so results to zero
utility for her.
Consumer’s total net utility is, then,
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U = −p0 + k1 {v1 − p1 + k2 [v2 − p2 + (1− q) (v2 − λp2)] + (1− k2) q (p2 − λv2)} (1.3)
1.2.3 Consumer’s behaviour and expectations
Consumer’s optimal consumption strategy is a function mapping valuations to purchase
decisions,
k∗ : [0, 1] −→ {0, 1} .
Before proceeding, we would like to provide some intuition about consumer’s possible
expectations and, particularly, the two extreme ones, namely, consumer believes that she
will buy second unit with certainty and consumer believes that she will not buy second unit
with certainty. In the first case, imagine that a customer of a mobile network provider wants
to decide whether to use her data on her mobile phone in order to watch the first season of
a TV show. She has no expectations about watching the first season but she knows that if
she does so, she will want to watch the second season as well.5 In the second case, consider
a consumer that buys some minutes on his mobile phone and believes that she will not need
to make any other calls when these minutes are over.6
1.2.4 Firm
Payment to the firm is a function of prices p = (p0, p1, p2) and consumer’s purchase choices,
k = (k1, k2) . This is
5This type of behaviour might remind the consumer in Becker & Murphy (1988) whose current consump-
tion of the good affects future consumption. However, in this study, we do not model rational addiction, as
Becker & Murphy (1988) do, but rather it might be one possible explanation why our consumer has such
expectations.
6This consumer reminds the one in Grubb (2009) where she underestimates the probability of buying
second unit but, eventually, when she consumes first unit, she figures out the true probability of buying it
and updates her planned strategy. In our case, when consumer has bought first unit and decides whether to
buy the second one or not, she does not modify her planned strategy but, actually, she makes her decision
taking into consideration her ex ante expectation of consuming it.
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P (k,p) = p0 + k1p1 + k1k2p2,
where firm receives the fixed fee, p0, regardless of the units sold and the prices of the units
sold if any.
If firm’s cost per unit of service is c ∈ [0, 1] , expected profit of the firm is its revenue
minus cost for each unit sold. Thus, firm’s profit function when consumer makes optimal
consumption decisions is




Let us go backwards and study consumer’s behaviour in period 2. When consumer learns
her valuation of the service in period 2 and has to decide whether to buy second unit or not,
she will choose to buy if her utility of buying is greater than the utility of not buying. Thus,
consumer sets a threshold of second-period valuation above which she buys second unit and
below which she prefers not to buy. Setting eq. (1.1) greater than eq. (1.2) yields our first
proposition:
Proposition 1.1. If consumer is loss-averse and her ex ante expectation is to buy second




[1 + q + (λ− 1) q] p2
2 + (λ− 1) q .
Observing the optimal threshold of buying second unit in Proposition 1.1, we can see
the effect of consumer’s ex ante expectations and loss aversion on her behaviour. Indeed, in
contrast to a non-loss-averse consumer who buys second unit if her second-period valuation
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is greater than the price of the second unit, a loss-averse consumer sets a lower threshold of
valuation above which she decides to buy second unit. In order to avoid the even greater loss
in utility she will incur if she does not buy second unit, she may buy it even if her valuation
in the period 2 is lower than the price, implying negative payoff for her but still less negative
than the payoff she gets if she does not buy. It becomes clear that loss aversion makes
consumer biased in favour of buying second unit compared to a non-loss-averse consumer.





1 + q + (λ− 1) q
2 + (λ− 1) q > 0,
∂v∗2
∂q
= −(3 + λ) (λ− 1) p2
[2 + (λ− 1) q]2 < 0.
For given q, as p2 increases, v
∗
2 also goes up. The intuition is straightforward: as the price of
second unit increases, consumer decreases the probability of buying it by raising the optimal
valuation threshold. On the contrary, for given p2, v
∗
2 is decreasing in q. The greater the ex
ante probability that consumer believes she will buy second unit, the more prone she is to
doing so when she is in period 2.
While the above derivatives are monotonic, differentiating v∗2 with respect to λ and keep-




2 (1− 2q) p2
[2 + (λ− 1) q]2

> 0 if q < 1
2
< 0 if q > 1
2
.
Whether v∗2 is increasing or decreasing in λ depends on the level of q. Specifically, if consumer
ex ante expects to buy second unit with sufficiently high probability, the more loss averse
she becomes, the more she increases the probability of buying it by lowering the optimal
valuation threshold. This is because when q is high, the negative effect of λ on consumer’s
utility is stronger is she does not purchase and, therefore, she increases the probability of
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purchasing. On the contrary, if q is low, an increase in λ reduces consumer’s utility if she
does not buy less than if she does buy and, therefore, she decreases the probability of buying
by increasing her optimal valuation threshold.
Period 1
Having determined utilities and optimal thresholds regarding second unit, we can now express
consumer’s expected utility in the contracting period. Denote by v1 consumer’s valuation of
the service in period 1 and by v∗1 the valuation threshold above which consumer decides to
buy first unit. Consumer’s expected utility in the contracting period is






















The first term of the sum is the fixed fee consumer pays to the firm if she accepts the contract.
The second term of the sum, the long integral, is consumer’s expected utility if she buys in
both periods.
Consumer’s optimal consumption strategy is to purchase in period 1 if her valuation






Maximising with respect to v∗1 and using previous results about second period optimal thresh-
olds, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2. If consumer is loss-averse and her ex ante expectation is to buy second
unit of service with probability q, her optimal strategy is to buy first unit if v1 > v
∗
1, where





[1− F (v)] dv + qλ
∫ v∗2
0
[1− F (v)] dv.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Regarding the period 1 optimal threshold, we observe that it depends not only on p1, but
also on p2, λ, q and the expectation of v2. When consumer decides whether to purchase in
period 1, she takes into consideration the price of first unit and her valuation of the service.
Nevertheless, consumer is forward-looking. Therefore, since buying in period 1 creates the
probability of buying also in period 2—which in turn creates the probability that the loss
aversion effect kicks in—before buying in period 1, consumer also considers the price of the
second unit, the ex ante expectation of buying second unit, her level of loss aversion and the
expectation of her period 2 valuation of service.
In what follows, we provide some comparative statics for the period 1 optimal threshold.
First, differentiating the optimal threshold, v∗1, with respect to the price of the first unit,
p1, we find that ∂v
∗
1/∂p1 = 1 > 0. The effect of an increase in the price of first unit on the
period 1 valuation threshold is clear and the intuition is straightforward: as first unit of
service becomes more expensive, consumer decreases the probability of buying in period 1
by increasing the optimal period 1 valuation threshold.
On the contrary, differentiating v∗1 with respect to p2, we obtain that
∂v∗1
∂p2
= 1 + (λ− 1) q − [1 + λ− (λ− 1) q]F (v∗2)
which yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1.1. Consumer increases the probability of buying first unit as the price of second




Consumer decreases her optimal valuation threshold in period 1 as the price of second unit
increases if her ex ante expectation of buying it, q, is sufficiently high but the actual proba-
bility of buying it, 1−F (v∗2) , is sufficiently low. A non-loss-averse consumer, who compares
only prices to valuations, would decrease the probability of buying as the price of second
unit goes up. However, in the case with a loss-averse consumer, depending on her ex ante
expectation of buying second unit, doing so might be considered as a loss either in service or
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money dimension. As a consequence, consumer might even raise the probability of buying
first unit and, therefore, the probability of buying second unit as well, even if second unit
becomes more expensive.
For instance, if q = 1, i.e., consumer ex ante expects to buy second unit with certainty, we











The intuition is the following: because p2 is assessed as a loss in money dimension when
consumer buys second unit but as a gain when she does not, since now the probability of
buying second unit is lower than the probability of not buying it, as p2 goes up, consumer
increases the probability of buying first unit and, therefore, the probability of facing the
gain of p2 in period 2. Nevertheless, if q = 0, i.e., consumer ex ante expects not to buy







> 0. Now, the two possible
scenarios are the following: either consumer buys second unit and incurs a loss in the money
dimension or she does not buy it and gains zero utility. It follows that in neither of the two
cases a raise in the price of the second unit can be beneficial for the consumer since not only
does it increase the probability of not buying and, therefore, getting zero utility but, also, it
reduces the utility of buying. Thus, since there is not any potential gain-loss utility induced
by an increase in the price of the second unit, if this price increases, consumer decreases the
probability of buying first unit by increasing her optimal period 1 valuation threshold.
1.3.2 Firm’s strategy
To begin with, we know that the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolistic firm when
consumer is non-loss-averse is to set a two-part tariff, namely price equal to marginal cost
for each unit and fixed fee equal to the consumer surplus.7 Since a non-loss-averse consumer
is assumed not to have any expectations or even if she has, she does not take them into
account when planning her consumption strategy, firm is able to have the first best profit
since it can extract all the consumer surplus through a fixed fee and set marginal cost pricing
for each unit sold.8
7See also Grubb (2015).
8For details, see Appendix A.
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Now, assume that we have a consumer with the preferences described in the previous
section and a rational, profit-maximising monopolistic firm which can observe consumer’s
preferences and expectations as well as the distribution of consumer’s valuations, F. Recall
that firm’s cost per unit of service is constant between the two periods and equal to c ∈ [0, 1] .
Firm’s profit for selling unit i is pi − c. Hence, firm’s expected total profit is











(p2 − c) f (v2) dv2
)
f (v1) dv1. (1.5)
The first term is the fixed fee firm paid if consumer accepts the contract and the second term
is the expected profit from selling first unit, which also considers the possibility of selling
second unit.
Let us now express firm’s profit as pi = S − U, where S is the social surplus produced.9
Firm’s objective is, then,
max
p
E (pi) = E [S (p)]− E [U (p)] s.t. E (U) ≥ 0. (1.6)
Firm maximises its expected profit which is the difference between expected social and ex-
pected consumer surplus subject to the participation constraint. Since we have one monopo-
listic firm, it maximises its profit setting expected consumer’s surplus equal to her reservation
level, which is zero. Thus, firm chooses marginal prices, p1 and p2, and adjusts the fixed fee,
p0, in order to make the participation constraint binding, i.e., E (U) = 0.
Adding eq. (1.4) and eq. (1.5) together and simplifying, we obtain that expected social
surplus is
9Note that this is the social surplus as perceived by consumer and firm. If one argues that loss aversion
is irrational, she will define consumer surplus as U˜ = −p0 + k1 [v1 − p1 + k2 (v2 − p2)] , where consumer’s
























Maximising eq. (1.6) with respect to p1 and p2 using eq. (1.7) yields Proposition 1.3 which
provides firm’s optimal pricing strategy.
Proposition 1.3. If consumer is loss-averse and her ex ante expectation is to buy second
unit of service with probability q, a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing strategy is:
If c > 0 :

p1 > c, p2 < c if q < q¯
p1 < c, p2 > c if q > q¯
If c = 0 :

p1 > 0, p2 = 0 if q < q¯
p1 = 0, p2 > 0 if q > q¯
where q¯ = [
1−F(v∗2)]λ
F(v∗2)+[1−F(v∗2)]λ
and p0 is equal to the corresponding perceived consumer surplus.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When consumer’s ex ante expectation is to buy second unit with sufficiently low probability,
if she buys, her consumption utility and gain-loss utility are greater than her gain-loss utility
if she does not buy. Thus, the firm, so as to create as much perceived consumer surplus as
possible and extract it through the fixed fee, has incentive to sell second unit at a price
even below marginal cost and, therefore, make the purchase of it more possible. In order to
compensate for the below marginal cost price of the second unit, firm needs to sell first unit
at a price greater than marginal cost. In turn, consumer, being forward-looking, is willing
to pay a high price for the first unit and, consequently, create the possibility of gaining the
utility from buying second unit as well.
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On the other hand, if consumer ex ante expects to buy second unit with sufficiently high
probability, when she compares buying to not buying, her gain-loss utility is greater in the
latter case. Therefore, firm finds it optimal to increase the price of the second unit above
marginal cost so that to decrease the probability that consumer actually buys it and, hence,
increase her gain-loss utility from not paying a high price.
In order to increase the probability that consumer buys first unit and, therefore, period
2 actually takes place, firm finds optimal to sell first unit at a price below marginal cost.
Interestingly, if firm’s per unit marginal cost is zero, as in the mobile network providers
market where the cost of each MB of internet provided is negligible, and assuming non-
negative prices, firm finds it optimal to offer first unit for free. This pricing scheme (three-
part tariff) is common in the market of mobile phone service, where the contracts offered
include a fixed fee, an allowance of minutes or data for free and high prices for consumption
beyond this allowance. However, in contrast to previous literature which suggests that firms
sell subsequent units of service expensively because consumers eventually become willing
to pay these high prices and acquire them, what we propose is that firms, knowing that
consumers expect to overconsume, charge these high prices to prevent them from buying,
make their expected perceived consumer surplus greater and absorb this high surplus through
fixed fees.
1.4 Uniform distribution
In this section, let us assume that consumer’s valuation of service in each period is distributed
uniformly in [0, 1] , i.e., f (v) = 1 and F (v) = v. This is a common assumption in the
literature which allows us to graphically illustrate the findings of Section 1.3.
In Figure 1.2, fixing p2 and λ, we graphically compare expected social surpluses as func-
tions of p1 in the case where q = 1. The blue curve is social surplus when firm sets marginal
cost pricing for both units. The blue dashed and dotted curves depict expected social sur-
pluses when firm sets price for the second unit above and below marginal cost, respectively.
Finally, the light orange curve is expected social surplus when consumer is non-loss-averse
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and firm’s optimal strategy is to set marginal cost pricing for both units.10 We observe
that the maximum possible expected social surplus is when firm charges second unit above
marginal cost. We can also notice that at the point where expected social surplus is at the
maximum level, the price of the first unit on the horizontal axis is below marginal cost.
Thus, we graphically demonstrate that firm finds it optimal to offer a contract consisting
of a three-part tariff. Because consumer expects to buy second unit, by selling it at a high
price, firm increases consumer surplus as perceived by her since it induces her not to buy
it and, therefore, gain-loss utility from not paying this high price. In order to increase the
probability that consumer experiences this gain in her utility, firm charges a low price for
first unit to make purchase of it more likely.
Figure 1.2: Expected social surplus as a function of p1 in the case q = 1 (c = 0.5, λ = 2).
Now, Figure 1.3 shows the graph of expected social surpluses in the case where q = 0.
In contrast to the previous graph, we observe here that if consumer is loss-averse and ex
ante expects not to buy second unit, expected social surplus is maximised when firm sells
second unit at a price below marginal cost. Also, at the point where expected social surplus
is maximised, price of the first unit is above marginal cost. Thus, we graphically verify
firm’s optimal pricing strategy for this case found in Section 1.3. However, differently to the
10For details on non-loss-averse consumer’s strategy and optimal firm’s response, see Appendix A.
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previous case, we also notice that expected social surplus can be even greater if consumer is
non-loss-averse.
Figure 1.3: Expected social surplus as a function of p1 in the case q = 0 (c = 0.5, λ = 2).
1.5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analysed, in a dynamic setting, how a loss-averse consumer’s expec-
tations about future consumption affect the pricing strategy of a rational profit-maximising
monopolistic firm. These expectations, combined with consumer’s non-standard preferences,
induce firm to deviate from the “first best” two-part tariff pricing, i.e., marginal cost pricing
and extraction of all consumer surplus through a fixed fee, which would be the case with a
non-loss-averse consumer. However, depending on consumer’s expectations, this distortion
in prices might even be beneficial for the firm despite consumer’s misperception of consumer
surplus. This occurs because firm can exploit consumer’s expectations and create more con-
sumer surplus as perceived by her and then absorb it through a fixed fee making higher




Competition for advantage: A two-stage
contest
2.1 Introduction
There are many situations in which a number of contestants compete with each other ex-
erting costly efforts in order to win a prize. These efforts include, among others, monetary
expenditures or time spending, while the prize awarded may include monopoly rents, sports
awards or fame. Beginning from the seminal works of Tullock (1980) and Krueger (1974) who
study rent-seeking, these competitions have been widely studied by economists, spawning
the contest theory literature.1
While most of the early research focuses on single-stage contests (Hillman & Riley 1989,
Baye et al. 1993), there are cases in which contests take place in more than one stage.
In this contests, the efforts submitted at the first stage affect the efforts and, therefore,
the payoffs of the subsequent stages.2 For instance, consider a pre-election period with two
lobbies, each of them supporting a specific candidate. In order to help its favourite candidate
win the election and, consequently, come to power, each lobby exerts effort (e.g., campaign
1For surveys of the literature, see Nitzan (1994), Corchón (2007), Konrad (2009) and Corchón & Serena
(2017).
2Harris & Vickers (1987) are the first to study a multi-stage race, in which the player who makes a specific
number of advances is the winner of the game. Konrad & Kovenock (2009) extend this study by adding
intermediate prizes awarded to the winner of each round.Some other relative studies are Klumpp & Polborn
(2006), Fu & Lu (2012) and Gelder (2014).
21
contributions, endorsements, media campaigns) to persuade the constituency to vote for her.
Then, the election takes place and one of the two candidates wins. The lobbies do not have a
direct benefit or loss at the end of the election since no policies have been implemented yet.
Now, both lobbies have to exercise pressure in order to influence the incumbent’s political
decisions in favour of their members’ welfare, regardless of who the winner of the election
is. However, it would be reasonable to assume that, once the winner of the election takes
office, the lobby which supported her prior to the election, being politically aligned with her,
will be more efficient at influencing her potential policy than the lobby that supported the
opposite candidate.
In this paper, we examine a two-stage contest with two players competing to win a single,
non-divisible prize. The two players are ex ante asymmetric in abilities, meaning that one
of them has an ex ante cost advantage. At the first stage, there is no award, but the two
players compete with each other in order to gain an advantage at the second stage. At the
beginning of the second stage, the first-stage winner and loser have been determined. The
first-stage winner obtains the advantage, which is expressed as a lower effort cost than her
opponent’s one at the second stage. Then, with the second-stage effort costs having been
allocated according to the outcome of the first stage, the two players compete again with
each other to win the final prize.
Regarding the structure of the game, at the second stage, the two players choose efforts
simultaneously, while at the first stage, we consider two cases: simultaneous and sequential
movement by the players. A model similar to the one of the first case has been analysed
by Clark et al. (2018). A difference between their model and the one in this paper is that
in the former, the main question addressed is the optimal prize distribution between the
two stages, whereas, in our study, the prize is indivisible and awarded at the end of the
contest. Also, in Clark et al. (2018), the favourite player’s ex ante advantage is carried over
to the second stage and, thus, affects the outcome of the game. In this paper, the ex ante
asymmetry affects only the outcome of the first stage and does not influence the second-stage
asymmetry.
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A justification of the elimination of the first-stage asymmetry at the second stage could
be the following. The forms of lobbying at the two stages are different. At the first stage, the
interest groups try to affect the voters’ behaviour, while at the second stage they attempt
to influence the incumbent politician’s behaviour. Therefore, we assume that advantage at
influencing the constituency at the first-stage does not necessarily affect the advantage at
affecting the politician’s policy at the second stage.
Finally, Clark et al. (2018) only consider simultaneous moves by the players at the first
stage, whereas in this paper, we, also, study the case in which players move sequentially.
This case arises when players do not choose how much effort to make simultaneously (Dixit
1987, Linster 1993, Leininger 1993, Morgan 2003, Serena 2017). For instance, since 1948, in
National Presidential Conventions, the parties of the incumbent presidents choose to have
their conventions closer to the general election (Morgan 2003).3 What distinguishes the
above studies from ours is that we do not examine a sequential contest independently, but
we embody it to the first stage of a two-stage contest. For example, before the election
takes place, a lobby might choose a candidate to contribute to before the opposing lobby
does. Then, we calculate the equilibrium efforts and expected payoffs of the two settings and
provide comparative static results. We compare them with each other, as well as with the
equilibrium efforts and expected payoffs of a contest with symmetric players at the first stage.
One of our results is that the strong (ex ante advantaged) player’s total equilibrium effort
and expected payoff are higher than the weak (ex ante disadvantaged) player’s, regardless of
whether she makes effort at the same time as her opponent, before or even after her. This
result indicates that the level of the ex ante advantage is a crucial factor in this contest.
Next, we endogenise the timing of the players’ first-stage efforts. In line with previous
literature (Baik & Shogren 1992, Leininger 1993, Morgan 2003), we show that if the two
players can choose the time of making efforts by declaring their intention to be the leader or
the follower, not only do both players prefer sequential first stage but, also, the weak player
always chooses to move first and the strong player to follow. This result establishes that
3See Morgan (2003) for more examples.
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sequential equilibrium arises endogenously, implying that the simultaneity of movements is
not a valid assumption.
This paper is also related to Clark & Nilssen (2013) who examine learning by doing in
a dynamic contest. However, one of their assumptions is that the greater the effort exerted
by a player at the first stage, the lower her effort cost at the second stage. In our model, a
player has to win at the first stage in order to enjoy a lower effort cost at the second stage,
regardless of the amount of effort she made.
Another study that is close to ours is Beviá & Corchón (2013). They, also, study a
two-period contest in which the second-stage asymmetry between the players depends on
the outcome of the first stage. However, each player’s ability depends on the share of the
prize earned in the first period.
Our study is, also, linked to the sequential contests literature. Leininger (1993) studies
a contest in which two players are allowed to choose the timing of their moves and shows
that sequential movement arises endogenously. Morgan (2003) assumes that the players’
valuations of the prize are not known until they commit to the timing of their moves. He,
also, finds that in equilibrium, the two players choose to make efforts sequentially. Fu (2006)
extends the above studies to the asymmetric information case.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we present our model
and the results of the analysis of the simultaneous first stage. In Section 2.3, we analyse the
contest with sequential moves at the first stage. Endogenous timing in the players’ choice of
effort is introduced in Section 2.4. Finally, some concluding remarks are in Section 2.5.
2.2 The game
Assume a two-stage contest with two players competing for a prize normalised to 1 and
awarded at the second stage. At the first stage, both players exert effort to gain an advantage
at the second stage. Their cost functions are both linear, but one of the two players, say
player 1, has a priori a lower effort cost than her opponent. We refer to this player as the
strong player and to her opponent, player 2, as the weak player. Submitting efforts x1 and
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x2, respectively, player 1’s cost function is c1 (x1) = ax1, where 0 < a ≤ 1, while player 2’s
cost function is c2 (x2) = x2. It is clear that player 1’s advantage is captured by her lower
marginal cost of effort, a ≤ 1.4
At the beginning of the second stage, the winner (player w) and loser (player l) of the
first stage have been determined. Now, assuming that player w and player l make efforts yw
and yl, respectively, player w’s cost function is cw (yw) = cwyw, while player l’s cost function
is cl (yl) = clyl, where 0 < cw < cl < 1 and cw, cl are known to the players. Thus, we could
say that the award the two players compete for at the first stage is a lower cost of effort at
the second stage.
Using the lottery contest success function (CSF) proposed by Tullock (1980) and axioma-
tised by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark & Riis (1998), we assume that each player’s probability
of winning at both stages equals the ratio of this player’s effort to the sum of efforts. Thus,
in general, when player i makes effort ei, i = 1, 2, her probability of winning is








The second case in the above CSF indicates that if both players exert zero effort, they win
the prize with equal probability. We use backward induction to determine the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.2.1 Second stage
The winner (player w) and loser (player l) of the first stage are known at the second stage.
Submitting effort yi, player i’s probability of winning is
yi
yw+yl
, i = w, l.
4We use non-strict inequality in order to include also the symmetric case a = 1, where the two players’
marginal costs are equal.
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Player i’s expected payoff is given by the probability of winning at the second stage times




− ciyi, i = w, l. (2.1)
Player i chooses how much effort to exert in order to maximise her expected payoff. The






2 − ci = 0, i, j ∈ {w, l} , j 6= i (2.2)





3 < 0 i, j ∈ {w, l} , j 6= i
which are satisfied for every yj.




2 i, j ∈ {w, l} , j 6= i. (2.3)
Observing the equilibrium efforts, we can verify the result of Nti (1999), i.e., the first-
stage winner’s equilibrium effort at the second stage, y∗w, is higher than the first-stage loser’s
one, y∗l .




2 , i, j ∈ {w, l} , j 6= i (2.4)
It is straightforward that since cw < cl, in equilibrium, player w’s expected payoff is higher
than player l’s. In the next section, we proceed with the analysis of the first stage.





We assume that at the first stage of the contest, the two players simultaneously choose their
effort xi, i = 1, 2. Recall that player 1 has an exogenous ex ante advantage, implying for
her effort cost equal to a, where 0 < a ≤ 1. Player 2’s effort cost is equal to 1. Player i’s
expected payoff is the sum of the probability of winning at the first stage and, thus, earning
a payoff piw at the second stage, plus the probability of losing at the first stage and, thus,
earning a payoff pil at the second stage, minus the first-stage expenditure. Therefore, player










a < 1 if i = 1,
a = 1 if i = 2.
The first-stage winner and loser’s payoffs are given by eq. (2.4). Thus, substituting
eq. (2.4) into the above equation and letting cw
cl
= c < 1, we obtain the following expression














a < 1 if i = 1,
a = 1 if i = 2.
(2.5)
Player 1 and player 2 choose how much effort to exert in order to maximise their expected
payoffs. The first order conditions of eq. (2.5) are
∂E (pii)
∂xi
= −a+ (1− c)xj
(1 + c) (x1 + x2)
2 = 0,
a < 1 if i = 1,
a = 1 if i = 2
j = 1, 2, j 6= i, (2.6)
6The term c can be interpreted as the level of advantage the two players compete for at the first stage.
When c increases, which means that either cw increases, cl decreases or both, the potential advantage becomes
lower and vice versa.
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and the second order sufficient conditions for a maximum are
∂2E (pii)
∂x2i
= − 2 (1− c)xj
(1 + c) (x1 + x2)
3 < 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2} , j 6= i
which are satisfied for every xj since c < 1.
Solving eq. (2.6) for x1 and x2, and substituting the results into eq. (2.5), we obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. When players move simultaneously at the first stage, there is a unique
















1 + a(2 + a)c2
(1 + c)2
and E∗ (pi2) =
1
(1 + a)2
a2 + (1 + 2a)c2
(1 + c)2
, (2.8)
respectively. The strong player’s first-stage effort and expected payoff are greater than or
equal to the weak player’s.
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is clear that when c = 1, players do not have incentive to exert any effort at the first
stage since they do not have any advantage to gain at the second stage. Moreover, when
a = 1, the problem reduces to a symmetric game, where in equilibrium, both players exert










Comparing eq. (2.7) and eq. (2.8) to the equilibrium efforts and payoffs in the symmetric
simultaneous game, yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. When the first stage is asymmetric [symmetric], player 1’s [player 2’s]
first-stage effort and expected payoff are greater than or equal to the ones in the case with
symmetric [asymmetric] first stage.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Because of her lower marginal cost, player 1’s effort is higher in the asymmetric simulta-
neous game than in the symmetric simultaneous game, resulting to higher expected payoff.
Nevertheless, in the asymmetric case, player 2 has a comparative disadvantage, and thus,
makes lower effort and has lower expected payoff than in the symmetric case where there are
not any advantages.









(1 + a)2(1 + c)2
< 0.
We summarise the above result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. When players move simultaneously at the first stage, their first-stage equi-
librium efforts increase as the level of the second-stage advantage they compete for increases.
The interpretation of this result is intuitive. If c falls, which means that either the first-
stage winner effort cost at the second stage, cw, decreases or the first-stage loser effort cost
at the second stage, cl, increases, or both, the two players have more incentives to raise their
initial effort and, therefore, increase their probability of winning. On the other hand, as c
goes up, the players are not highly-motivated to win at the first stage and, therefore, they
lessen their effort. Moreover, the result that ∂x∗2/∂c < 0 does not hold when the first-stage
advantage is carried over to the second stage as in Clark et al. (2013) since in that case, the
sign of the partial derivative is ambiguous and depends on the level of this advantage.
















Player 1 makes greater [lower] effort as her own marginal cost decreases [increases], while
player 2 makes lower [greater] effort as her opponent’s marginal cost decreases [increases].
As demonstrated earlier, the equilibrium efforts are monotonic in c and a. Nevertheless,
comparative static analysis of the equilibrium expected payoffs is a more complicated task.
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In particular, comparative static analysis for player 1’s equilibrium expected payoff yields
the following:
• For 0 < a ≤ √2− 1,
∂E∗ (pi1)
∂c
< 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1) .

















< 0, if c < a
2
2a+1
> 0, if c > a
2
2a+1
∀a ∈ (0, 1] .

















The above results are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4. When players make efforts simultaneously at the first stage,





2 − 1 < a ≤ 1, player 1’s expected payoff decreases [increases] as the second-stage





iii) player 2’s expected payoff decreases [increases] as the second-stage advantage decreases
if c < [>] a
2
2a+1
, ∀a ∈ (0, 1].
iv) player 1’s [player 2’s] expected payoff is increasing [decreasing] in her own [opponent’s]
ex ante advantage.
Let us focus on player 1 and discuss the first two cases.7 Proposition 2.4(i) states that when
player 1 is sufficiently strong ex ante (a ≤ √2− 1), her expected payoff is increasing in the
second-stage advantage (Figure 2.1). This occurs because since her ex ante advantage is
high, the probability of winning at the first stage and, therefore, gaining the second-stage
advantage at the second stage, is high, too. Thus, a raise in the second-stage advantage may
only increase her expected payoff.
Figure 2.1: Player 1 and player 2’s expected payoffs for 0 < a ≤ √2− 1.
On the other hand, in Proposition 2.4(ii), we observe that since player 1 is not sufficiently
strong (a >
√
2−1) and, therefore, the probability of winning at the first stage is not as high
as in the previous case, the way player 1’s expected payoff reacts to changes in the second-
stage advantage depends on the level of this advantage. In particular, if the second-stage
7The same intuition holds for player 2 in Proposition 2.4(iii).
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advantage the two players compete for is sufficiently great or, equivalently, c is sufficiently
low, player 1’s expected payoff remains being increasing in it. However, if the second-stage
advantage is sufficiently low, player 1’s expected payoff decreases as this advantage becomes
greater (Figure 2.2).
If we consider that the second-stage advantage is the “prize” the two players compete for
at the first stage, this part of the proposition implies that player 1’s expected payoff may
be decreasing in the level of the “prize”. It is interesting that this occurs despite the fact
that player 1 still exerts effort greater than or equal to player 2’s (a ≤ 1) and, thus, her
probability of winning the “prize” continues to be greater than or equal to her opponent’s.
Observing the blue curve in Figure 2.2, starting from the point c = 1 and moving to the
left, a marginal decrease in c reduces player’s expected payoff. The intuition is that the
increase in effort induced by the decrease in c is not beneficial for the player since even if she
wins at the first stage, her second-stage advantage will still be not significant. Nevertheless,
when the second-stage advantage exceeds a specific level, despite the greater effort induced,
expected payoff increases because of the high potential second-stage advantage if player 1
wins at the first stage.
Figure 2.2: Player 1 and player 2’s expected payoffs for
√
2− 1 < a ≤ 1.
Nti (1999) considers two players with different valuations of the prize and shows that
a player’s expected payoff increases with her own valuation and decreases with the other
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player’s valuation. In our model, there are two crucial differences. First, players are asym-
metric in their cost function and not in the valuation of the second-stage advantage and
second, the “prize” of the first stage is not an actual award but earning it only increases
the probability of winning the final prize at the second stage. Because of these reasons, a
player’s expected payoff is not monotonic in the second-stage advantage but convex instead.
2.3 Sequential first stage
We, now, extend the model to the case where the two players choose their amount of effort
sequentially at the first stage.8 Following Leininger (1993), we distinguish two possible cases.
In the first case (1-2), the strong player (player 1) chooses first how much effort to exert and
the weak player (player 2) chooses effort second knowing player 1’s earlier decision. In the
second case (2-1), player 2 makes effort first and player 1 follows.
First case (1-2). Player 1 exerts effort first and player 2 makes her own effort after having

















The solution of this optimisation problem is








Taking into consideration that x∗2 ≥ 0, meaning that a player is not able to make negative
effort, player 2’s equilibrium strategy as a function of player 1’s effort (player 2’s reaction
function) is




















Player 2 makes a positive effort only if player 1’s effort is less than 1−c
1+c
.
When player 1 decides how much effort to exert, she takes into account player 2’s reaction



















and substituting eq. (2.10) into the above expression, we find that when player 1 is the leader











































< 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1).
Solving the first order condition for x1, we find that player 1 maximises her expected
payoff when she chooses effort xL1 = 14a2
1−c
1+c
and from eq. (2.10) we discover that player 2
responses choosing xF2 = 2a−14a2
1−c
1+c
. For x1 ≥ 1−c1+c , we can easily notice that player 1’s expected
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payoff is maximised when she chooses effort equal to xL1 = 1−c1+c , which implies zero effort
for player 2. Substituting the equilibrium first-stage efforts into eq. (2.11) for player 1 and




the following proposition emerges:
Proposition 2.5. When at the first stage player 1 moves first and player 2 follows, their




























if 0 < a ≤ 1
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and their expected payoffs
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1 + (4a− 1) c2
4a (1 + c)2
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(2a− 1)2 + (4a− 1) c2





< a ≤ 1
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if 0 < a ≤ 1
2
.
Player 1’s first-stage equilibrium effort and expected payoff are always greater than or equal
to player 2’s.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Comparative static analysis yields the following:











=⇒ a > 1
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Also, differentiating the equilibrium efforts with respect to a, we find that, for 1
2
















where we observe that player 1’s effort is decreasing in a, while player 2’s effort increases as
her opponent’s ex ante advantage increases. However, if 0 < a ≤ 1
2
, player 1’s choice of effort
does not depend on her ex ante advantage since she always chooses to make effort equal to
1−c
1+c
, which induces player 2 not to make any effort. In such a case, it is pointless for player 1
to exert greater effort since her opponent chooses to enter the game only if player 1’s effort
cost is greater than 1
2
.
Figure 2.3: Player 1 (leader) and player 2’s (follower) first-stage effort.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the two players’ optimal strategies when player 1 chooses effort first.
When a ≤ 1
2
, only the strong player submits effort, while when a > 1
2
, her effort declines
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and the opponent player’s effort increases as a goes up. When a becomes equal to 1, neither





. In the latter case, because of the symmetric setting, sequential moves by the
players do not affect the simultaneous equilibrium level of efforts.
We summarise the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.6. When at the first stage player 1 moves first and player 2 follows,
• if 1
2
< a ≤ 1,
i) both players’ first-stage equilibrium effort increases as the second-stage advantage
increases.
ii) player 1’s [player 2’s] effort increases [decreases] as her own [opponent’s] ex ante
advantage increases.
• if 0 < a ≤ 1
2
,
i) player 1’s first-stage equilibrium effort increases as the second-stage advantage
increases, while player 2’s first-stage effort remains constant and equal to zero.
ii) both players’ equilibrium efforts remain constant as the ex ante advantage varies.
Comparative static analysis for player 1’s equilibrium expected payoff yields the following:
• For 1
2




(4a− 1) c− 1
2a (1 + c)3

< 0, if 0 < c < 1
4a−1
> 0, if 1
4a−1 < c ≤ 1






a (1 + c)− 1
2a (1 + c)3
< 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1).
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It is obvious that when her ex ante advantage is not sufficiently great (1
2
< a ≤ 1), the way
player 1’s expected payoff reacts to changes in the second-stage advantage, also, depends on
the level of this advantage. When it is sufficiently big (0 < c < 1
4a−1), player 1’s expected
payoff increases as this advantage increases (or, equivalently, c decreases). However, when
the advantage the two players compete for is not sufficiently great ( 1
4a−1 < c < 1), player 1’s
expected payoff can even be decreasing in this advantage (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Player 1 (leader) and player 2’s (follower) expected payoffs for 1
2
< a ≤ 1.
On the other hand, when player 1’s ex ante advantage is significant (0 < a ≤ 1
2
), the
probability that she will gain the second-stage advantage is greater than in the previous case
and, thus, an increase in this advantage also increases her expected payoff (Figure 2.5).
Similarly to the analysis above, for player 2 we have:
• For 1
2




(4a− 1) c− (2a− 1)2
2a2 (1 + c)3

< 0, if 0 < c < (2a−1)
2
4a−1
> 0, if (2a−1)
2
4a−1 < c < 1












> 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1) .
If player 1 has a great ex ante advantage over player 2 then the latter one’s expected payoff
decreases as the second-stage advantage increases regardless of the level of this advantage.
Nevertheless, if her opponent’s ex ante advantage is not sufficiently great, player 2’s expected
payoff can be increasing in the second-stage advantage if it is sufficiently important.
Second case (2-1). Now, player 2 chooses first how much effort to make and player 1
follows after having observed this amount of effort. Following the same process as before,








































































< 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1) and ∀a ∈ (0, 1].
Solving the first order condition, we find that player 2’s expected payoff is maximised


















2 , ∀a ∈ (0, 1], (for proof, see Appendix B) meaning that her expected




regardless of the value of a.










The two players’ equilibrium efforts and expected payoffs are summarised in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.7. When at the first stage player 2 moves first and player 1 follows, their
















and EF (pi1) =
(2− a)2 + (4− a)ac2
4(1 + c)2
,
respectively. Player 1’s first-stage equilibrium effort and expected payoff are greater than or
equal to player 2’s.
Proof. See Appendix B.
From the above proposition, the following corollary emerges:
Corollary 2.1. When at the first stage player 2 moves first, player 1 will never be inactive.
As we can see in Figure 2.6, the above lemma brings out a situation different from the
“1-2” case, in which the follower may response choosing not to participate at the first stage.
Now, the follower, being the strong player, will never prefer to stay inactive at the first stage.
In addition, despite the fact that player 2 makes her move first, player 1 will still exert higher
first-stage effort, but not as high as her first-stage effort when she moves first.
Figure 2.6: Player 2 (leader) and player 1’s (follower) first-stage effort.
Comparison of the equilibrium efforts and expected payoffs of the simultaneous, “1-2”
and “2-1” case provides the following corollary:
Corollary 2.2. Player 1’s first-stage effort and expected payoff are greater than or equal to
player 2’s regardless of the sequence of their moves.
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The following proposition demonstrates the results of the comparison among the total
efforts of the type of contests mentioned above.
Proposition 2.8. i) When at the first stage player 1 moves first, aggregate effort of the
two-stage contest is greater than or equal to aggregate effort when the two players move
simultaneously.
ii) When at the first stage the two players move simultaneously, aggregate effort of the
two-stage contest is greater than or equal to aggregate effort when player 2 moves first.
Proof. See Appendix B.














for player 2, and
∂xF1
∂c










for player 1. We can note that both players’ equilibrium first-stage efforts decrease as the
second-stage advantage decreases. Also, as player 1’s ex ante advantage increases, her effort
increases, while her opponent’s effort decreases.




(4− a) c− a
2 (1 + c)3

< 0, if c < a
4−a
> 0, if c > a
4−a
∀a ∈ (0, 1].
Likewise, for player 1 we have
• For 0 < a ≤ 2−√2,
∂EF (pi1)
∂c
< 0, ∀c ∈ (0, 1).
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a (4− a) c− (2− a)2
2 (1 + c)3

< 0, if c < (2−a)
2
a(4−a)
> 0, if c > (2−a)
2
a(4−a) .
The above analysis of the two players’ expected payoffs is illustrated in Figure 2.7 and
Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.7: Player 2 (leader) and player 1’s (follower) expected payoffs for 2−√2 < a ≤ 1.
Figure 2.8: Player 2 (leader) and player 1’s (follower) expected payoffs for 0 < a ≤ 2−√2.
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2.4 Endogenous timing
In this section, we assume that before the contest begins, each player is able to decide
whether she wants to move early and, thus, become a leader or late and, thus, become a
follower. In order to decide their strategy, the two players have to compare their expected
payoff in each situation.
There are four possible scenarios: (L, L), (F, F), in which both players choose to move
first and second respectively; (L, F), in which player 1 chooses to play first and player 2
second and (F, L), in which player 2 chooses to play first and player 1 chooses to follow.




L E∗ (pi1) , E∗ (pi2) EL (pi1) , EF (pi2)
F EF (pi1) , EL (pi2) E∗ (pi1) , E∗ (pi2)
Table 2.1: Player 1 and player 2’s expected payoffs.
Equilibrium analysis of the game yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2.9. There is a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, in which player 2
chooses to make effort first and player 1 chooses to follow.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The above proposition demonstrates that when at the first stage players compete for
a second-stage advantage, the sequence of moves with the weak player leading is the only
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
It, also, yields an interesting result for the strong player. The fact that E∗ (pi1) ≤
EL (pi1) ≤ EF (pi1) means that besides the fact that player 1 has greater payoff when she moves
first than when she moves simultaneously with player 2, she has even greater payoff when
she enters the contest after her rival. This fact implies that even if her ex ante advantage is
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high (0 < a ≤ 1
2
), player 1 does not choose to make effort first and, therefore, induce player 2
to abstain from participating at the first stage, but, instead, she always prefers her opponent
to participate. On the other hand, because of the fact that EF (pi2) ≤ E∗ (pi2) ≤ ELl (pi2) ,
player 2 has the greatest possible payoff when she moves first and the lowest when she moves
after player 1.
2.5 Conclusion
We have analysed a two-stage contest with two players competing with each other to gain
an advantage at the first stage, which will help them win a final prize at the second stage.
In the case with simultaneous moves by the two players at the first stage, we find that the
stronger player exerts higher first-stage effort and earns greater expected payoff.
When players move sequentially at the first stage, if the favourite player is strong enough,
her opponent will choose not to participate at the first stage. She opts to withdraw from the
competition for advantage and take part only at the final stage of the contest. On the other
hand, regardless of the order of moves, the strong player not only will take part at the first
stage but, also, she will exert higher effort and earn greater expected payoff than her rival.
Moreover, total effort of the two-stage contest is higher when at the first stage the favourite
player moves first. Finally, if players can choose the timing of their first-stage efforts, they
both prefer an order in which the weak player plays first and the strong one follows.
What we can derive from this study is that the strong player’s ex ante advantage is the
pivotal factor in this two-stage contest since it makes her front-runner in all cases discussed
above. However, the level of her leverage depends on the degree of the ex ante heterogeneity
in abilities between the two players, as well as on the order of their first-stage moves. A
natural extension of the model includes the introduction of incomplete information about






It is generally admitted that interest groups play an important role in the political process. A
significant part of the lobbying literature (Austen-Smith 1987, Baron 1994) considers interest
groups with electoral motives. These groups take the candidates’ positions as given and offer
them campaign contributions. Contributions are typically spent by candidates on campaign
activities that aim at persuading the constituency to vote for them and, thus, affecting
their probability of winning. Another strand of the literature assumes that lobbying occurs
after the election. Lobbying takes the form of either monetary contributions offered to the
incumbent politician (Krueger 1974, Becker 1983, Lohmann 1995, Bennedsen & Feldmann
2006, Martimort & Semenov 2008) or informational lobbying with exogenous lobbying costs
(Potters & van Winden 1992). That is, the relative literature, typically, considers political
influence either before or after the election as separate cases.1
Nevertheless, political influence is a continuous activity which does not end once the
election is concluded. After the election, and regardless of the winner, interest groups need
to influence the implemented policies. Tripathi et al. (2002) use data from the 1995 Lobby
1See, for instance, Baron (1994), Grossman & Helpman (1994, 1996). Two papers that study both
combine campaign contributions and lobbying are Austen-Smith (1995) and Felli & Merlo (2012). However,
Austen-Smith (1995) “abstracts from details of the electoral process” assuming that the probability that a
candidate wins is exogenous and, thus, not affected by the campaign contributions she receives. Moreover,
Felli & Merlo (2012) consider a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy and their main question
is to what extent lobbying affects equilibrium policy outcomes.
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Disclosure Act and find strong connection between campaign expenditures and lobbying.
More specifically, “groups that have both a lobbyist and a PAC [...] account for fully 70% of
all interest group expenditures and 86% of all PAC contributions”.
In this paper, we consider jointly pre and post-electoral political influence and, endoge-
nously, determine the optimal level of the “access” price politicians charge to the interest
groups. Our results show that a candidate commits to charge a lower lobbying price to the
group that is going to support her at the election. That is, our results support the idea
that contributions may buy “access” for lobbying activities such as “preferential treatment”
by the incumbent or amplification of the group’s message (Wright 1990). As put by Wright
(1990), our result shows that “representatives may ‘hear you better’ [...] when a contribution
precedes lobbying”.
Adding the assumption that candidates are asymmetric in skills, i.e., one candidate is
inherently stronger than the other one in the election, we show that again both candidates
treat one of the groups preferentially. Nevertheless, such preferential treatment is much more
pronounced for the access prices announced by the less skilled candidate. Also, we show that
total lobbying activity is more intense if the less skilled candidate wins the election, indicating
that a less skilled politician is more prone to political influence once in office. This result is in
line with the perspective of “informational lobbying” where interest groups possess valuable
information or advice and they strategically provide it to an unaware politician in office.
We model the above situation as a three-stage game with two symmetric interest groups
and two candidates. At stage zero (pricing stage), the two candidates set the level of lobbying
prices they are going to charge the two groups if they are elected. At the first stage (election
stage), each group offers a monetary contribution to its favourite candidate that is used by
her in order to increase her electoral support and, then, the election takes place. At the
second stage (lobbying stage), the two groups compete exerting lobbying efforts in order to
influence the winner’s policy decision.
The first and second stages have the characteristics of a two-stage Tullock contest. Groups
compete against each other twice, once before and once after the election takes place. At
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the lobbying stage (the second stage of the “contest”), the two groups engage in a contest
for a given prize, e.g., their favourite policy being implemented, by exerting costly lobbying
efforts.2 A unit of lobbying effort can be viewed, for instance, as an hour spent in the
incumbent’s office. At the election stage (the first stage of the “contest”), the two groups
compete by offering campaign contributions to their favourite candidate so that they affect
the electoral outcome.3 That is, like Austen-Smith (1987) and Baron (1994), groups have
an electoral motive, meaning that each group takes as given the candidates’ positions and
offers a contribution to its favourite candidate in order to increase her probability of winning
the election. The “award” the two groups fight for at the election stage is an endogenously
determined lower lobbying price at the lobbying stage.
The prices of lobbying efforts charged by the winning candidate are chosen strategically
by the two candidates at stage zero (pricing stage). Candidates can choose to charge the two
groups any price so as to maximise their expected revenue from lobbying. By announcing the
offered lobbying prices, candidates simultaneously affect their probability of being elected
and their revenues from lobbying if in office.
The endogenous choice of lobbying prices (stage zero) constitutes our main contribution
to the existing literature in contest theory4 and, more particularly, works on multi-stage
contests (Gradstein & Konrad 1999, Moldovanu & Sela 2006, Konrad & Kovenock 2009, Fu
et al. 2015). Clark et al. (2018) consider a two-stage contest in which the winner of the
first stage faces by assumption a lower cost of effort at the second stage. Not only does our
study provide support to this assumption, but also our results differ significantly due to the
different assumed objective functions. In contrast to us, Clark et al. (2018) are concerned
about the maximisation of the total effort exerted at the two stages of the contest and
they find that the optimal level of second-stage cost offered by an effort-maximising contest
designer should be zero. As a result, the two-stage contest reduces to a one-shot contest
2Besley & Coate (2001) model lobbying as a menu-auction and Felli & Merlo (2012) assume that the
winner of the election chooses with which groups she will trade off policy favours for transfers.
3We assume that contributions cannot be carried over to the next stage and, thus, the whole amount is
spent at the election stage.
4For surveys on the contest theory literature, see Nitzan (1994), Konrad (2009), Balart et al. (2016),
Corchón & Serena (2017).
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since the loser of the first stage does not make any effort at the second stage. The fact that
we are concerned about candidates’ expected revenue, rather than total effort, makes the
two-stage contest meaningful and allows us to determine the optimal revenue-maximising
level of the second-stage effort cost. Clark et al. (2018), instead, assume that this cost is out
of the designer’s control and study optimal prize distribution between the two stages.
In previous work, Clark & Nilssen (2013), also, consider a two-stage contest in which
they, exogenously, assume that the greater the effort exerted by a player at the first stage,
the lower her effort cost at the second stage. In our model, instead, the levels of effort
cost (lobbying prices) are set by the candidates endogenously before the first-stage efforts
(contributions) are made.
Another study close to ours is Beviá & Corchón (2013). They study a two-stage contest
in which the second-stage asymmetry between the players depends on the outcome of the
first stage. In their model, each player’s second-stage ability depends on the share of the
prize earned in the first period. On the contrary, in our study, first, there is no award for the
interest groups at the election stage and, second, only the group that supported the winner
of the election benefits at the lobbying stage, regardless of the level of expenditures it made
before the election.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In Section 3.2, we formalise the game. In Section 3.3,
we analyse the symmetric game and present the results of the analysis. In Section 3.4, we
study the case with candidates of different skills while Section 3.5 concludes the study.
3.2 The game
Consider two symmetric candidates, {A,B}, and two symmetric interest groups, {a, b},
where groups a and b support candidates A and B, respectively. The game consists of three
stages: the pricing stage, the election stage and the lobbying stage.
At stage zero (pricing stage), the two candidates, having as objective the maximisation
of their expected lobbying revenue, choose the level of lobbying prices to charge each group
if they win the election. Denote by cI,i > 0 the lobbying price set by candidate I for the
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group that supported her at the election, group i, and cI,j > 0 for the opposite group, group
j, where for I = A, i = a and j = b and for I = B, i = b and j = a.
At the first stage (election stage), the two groups choose their levels of contribution to
their favourite candidate. The contributions received by the two candidates are spent at
this specific stage for campaign purposes and determine their probability of winning the
election.5 Particularly, the probability that a specific candidate wins is increasing in the
contribution received by her and decreasing in the contribution received by her opponent.
Let xi ≥ 0 denote the contribution made by group i to candidate I and the marginal cost
of contribution be the same for both groups and normalised to 1. Since each candidate I is
supported by group i, we express the probability that candidate I wins at the election stage














while the probability that she loses, or, equivalently, candidate J, supported by group j, wins
is qJ = 1− qI .6
At the final stage (lobbying stage), the two groups lobby the winner of the election.
Assume that the winner is candidate I who was supported by group i. Denote the lobbying
effort of group i by yi ≥ 0. The lobbying price group i is charged is cI,i, while the price group
j is charged is cI,j. Considering linear cost functions for the two groups, the cost function





5We consider impressionable voters, i.e., they are swayed toward one party or the other by the messages
they receive during the campaign (Baron 1994, Grossman & Helpman 1996).
6At the election stage, we assume that the probability that a party wins is given by a Tullock contest
success function depending only on the efforts of the two groups. Jia (2008) and Jia et al. (2013) show that
this CSF is microfounded when voters are impressionable with utility ti
(




i, where θi is a
random variable, independently drawn from an Inverse Exponential Distribution, that measures how much
voter i is affected by campaign spending (See also Balart et al. (2018)).
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while the the probability that group j wins is pj = 1−pi. The winning group of the lobbying
stage enjoys the implementation of its favourite policy, the valuation of which is equal for
both groups and normalised to 1. Expected payoff of each group is the probability of winning
minus its lobbying expenditure. Hence, at the lobbying stage, expected payoffs of groups i
and j are, respectively,
pii = pi − cI,iyi, and pij = 1− pi − cI,jyj. (3.2)
Going backwards, at the election stage, the expected payoff of group i, Πi, is the following:
the probability that its favourite candidate wins times its lobbying-stage payoff if she wins,
plus the probability that her favourite candidate loses times its lobbying-stage payoff is she
loses (slightly abusing notation we refer to this as pi−i), minus its contribution. Making use
of eq. (3.1), we have that at the election stage, expected payoff of group i is









At the first stage of the game, the two candidates set the lobbying prices they are going
to charge if they win the election. They do so having as objective to maximise their lobbying
revenue, where losing the election implies zero payoff. Therefore, at the beginning of the
game, candidate I’s expected revenue, rI , is equal to the probability that she wins the election














We proceed with the analysis of the game.
3.3 Results
We make use of backward induction to determine the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of
the game in pure strategies.
3.3.1 Lobbying stage
This stage of the game is an asymmetric Tullock contest previously analysed, among others,
by Nti (1999). Assume that the winner of the election is candidate I. Maximising eq. (3.2)
with respect to yi and yj, respectively, we find that in equilibrium, lobbying efforts of groups











)2 and pi∗j = c2I,i(
cI,i + cI,j
)2 . (3.6)
We observe that if cI,i ≤ cI,j, then y∗i ≥ y∗j and pi∗i ≥ pi∗j . If a politician charges a lower
lobbying price to one group, then this group exerts greater lobbying effort and earns greater
payoff than the other one.
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3.3.2 Election stage
Group i chooses the level of contribution, xi, to offer to her favourite candidate, I, in order






















The equilibrium contributions offered by the two groups are given by the following propo-
sition.







4 , if cA,acB,b < cB,acA,b
0, if cA,acB,b ≥ cB,acA,b.
(3.8)



















2 − 1 = 0 (3.9)





















which are satisfied for cA,acB,b < cB,acA,b.
Solving eq. (3.9) simultaneously for the two groups, a and b, we obtain the results in the
proposition.
The first thing we notice in Proposition 3.1 is that either both groups choose not to make
any contribution or both groups make positive contributions in the election stage. Groups
make zero contributions if the product of the lobbying prices set by their favourite candidates
is greater than the product of the lobbying prices set by the opposite candidates. That is, if
interest groups are not treated sufficiently well by the candidates and the announced lobbying
prices are not favourable, they prefer to remain inactive.
The equilibrium characterisation also offers several interesting comparative statics (for
details, see Appendix C). First, the equilibrium effort of group i, x∗i , is decreasing in the
price its favourite candidate has committed to charge to it, cI,i, i.e., ∂x
∗
i /∂cI,i < 0. This
indicates that as a candidate decreases the price she is going to charge to the group that
supports her if she wins the election, the group supporting her contributes more in order
to increase this candidate’s probability of winning and, therefore, the probability that the
group will pay this lower price (blue curve in Figure 3.1). Second, the equilibrium effort of
group i, x∗i , is increasing in the price its favourite candidate has committed to charge the
opposite group j, cI,j, i.e., ∂x
∗
i /∂cI,j > 0. This shows that a group increases the contribution
to its favourite candidate as she increases the lobbying price she commits to charge to the
opposite group if she wins. By increasing its contribution, a group increases the probability
that her favourite candidate wins the election and, in consequence, that its favourable policy
will be implemented at the lobbying stage since the opposite group will make a low lobbying
effort having to pay a high lobbying price.
However, differentiating x∗i with respect to cJ,j, we find that the effect of a change in the
lobbying price candidate J commits to charge to her favourite group on the contribution
received by candidate I is non-monotonic (green curve in Figure 3.1). More specifically, if
a candidate commits to charge to the group supporting her a relatively low lobbying price,
in case she wins, the payoff of the opposite group at the lobbying stage will be low. As
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Figure 3.1: Contributions of groups i and j as a function of cI,i (cJ,j = cI,j = cJ,i = 1).
this price goes up, the latter group may increase its contribution in order to increase the
probability that its favourite candidate wins and, consequently, decrease the probability that
it will get a low payoff. If, now, the lobbying price a candidate commits to charge to her
favourite group is relatively high, in case she wins, the payoff of the opposite group is going
to be high as well. Thus, as this price increases even more, the latter group has an incentive
to decrease its contribution to its favourite candidate in order to increase the probability
that the opposite candidate wins and, therefore, the probability that it gets a high payoff.7
3.3.3 Pricing stage
Candidate I commits to charge to groups i and j prices cI,i and cI,j, respectively, that max-
imise eq. (3.4) taking into consideration eq. (3.5) and eq. (3.8). Candidate I’s maximisation
problem is, then,
















































Let us, now, explore how candidates’ expected revenue changes when the lobbying prices
change (for a complete analysis, see Appendix C). First, candidate I’s expected revenue
is strictly increasing in the lobbying price candidate J commits to charge to group j, i.e.,
∂rI/∂cJ,j > 0. This happens because group j decreases its contribution to her favourite
candidate, J, and, therefore, the probability that candidate I wins goes up increasing I’s
expected revenue. Moreover, candidate I’s expected revenue is strictly decreasing in the
lobbying price candidate J commits to charge to group i, i.e., ∂rI/∂cJ,i < 0. This occurs
because I’s expected revenue decreases through her probability of winning the election which
is decreasing in the lobbying price J commits to charge to group i.
However, while a candidate’s expected revenue is monotonic in the lobbying prices set by
the opposite candidate, this is not the case for the lobbying prices set by herself. Candidate
I’s expected revenue is decreasing in cI,i, i.e., ∂rI/∂cI,i < 0, if cI,j and cJ,j are sufficiently low.
This happens because as cI,i goes up, group i decreases its contribution to candidate I and,
also, because cI,j is low, group j increases its contribution to its own favourite candidate,
J. These two effects lead to a decrease in candidate I’s probability of winning and, thus, to
a reduction in her expected revenue. On the other hand, candidate I’s expected revenue is
increasing in cI,i, i.e., ∂rI/∂cI,i > 0, if cI,j is sufficiently high and cJ,j sufficiently low, or if
just cJ,j is sufficiently high. Now, while along group i also group j decreases its contribution
making the effect in candidate I’s probability of winning ambiguous, it is the positive effect
of an increase in cI,i and a high cI,j on her revenue if she wins that makes her expected
57
revenue increasing in cI,i.
8
The candidates’ maximisation problem highlights the main trade-off they face when op-
timally setting the “access” prices interest groups will have to pay to them if they win the
office. On the one hand, as a candidate opts for higher lobbying prices, the higher her lob-
bying revenue if she wins the election. On the other hand, higher lobbying prices decrease
the contribution received at the election stage and, therefore, the probability of winning the
election. Balancing these two opposing effects appropriately determines the optimal lobbying
prices as characterised in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. There are multiple equilibria in the symmetric pricing stage game in all of
which the lobbying prices candidate I ∈ {A,B} commits to charge to the two groups satisfy













her lobbying revenue is r∗ =
√



































































8A similar intuition applies for the effect of a change in cI,j on rI .
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Solving the above system of equations simultaneously for the two candidates yields infinite
solutions which satisfy the equation in the proposition. Substituting these results to eq. (3.8),
eq. (3.7) and eq. (3.10), we find the expected contributions candidates receive, the expected
payoffs of the two groups and the two candidates’ expected lobbying revenues, respectively.
To guarantee that these solutions constitute a Nash equilibrium, we proceed as follows.
Assume that candidate J sets c∗J = 12
(√
5− 1) . We will check whether candidate I has an
incentive to set a lobbying price ratio different from c∗I = 12
(√
5− 1) , say c′I = k > 0, and
earn revenue greater than
√
5 − 2. Substituting cJ,j = 12
(√
5− 1) cJ,i and cI,i = kcI,j to
candidate I’s objective function, eq. (3.10), and after some algebra, we obtain:
k
[(√

























(k + 1)3 > 0
Consider the function f (k) = k
[(√
5− 1) k + 2√5] − (√5− 2) (1 +√5) (k + 1)3 , where
k ∈ (0,∞) . Differentiating f, we have f ′ (k) = k [3 (√5− 3) k + 8√5− 20]+5√5−9 which
is equal to zero when k = 1
2
(√
5− 1) . The second derivative is f ′′ (k) = −6 (3−√5) k −(
20− 8√5) < 0, so f is concave, meaning that at k = 1
2
(√
5− 1) , f is maximised. At this





5− 1)) = 0 which indicates that the function cannot be
greater than zero. Thus, candidate I does not have incentive to deviate.
Since c∗I = 12
(√
5− 1) < 1, the above proposition states that each candidate commits
to charge her favourite group a lobbying price lower than the one she commits to charge
to the opposite group. This is an interesting result since we obtain endogenously—and not
assume a priori like the majority of the studies in the literature—that the interest group
that supports a candidate will be in an advantageous position after the election if the specific
candidate wins.
Proposition 3.2 highlights that a candidate’s expected revenue and contributions received
do not depend on the absolute values of the lobbying prices she commits to charge but only
59
on their ratio. This indicates that although a lobbying revenue maximising candidate should
set the lobbying price ratio of Proposition 3.2, the absolute values of the prices may depend
on her own views about lobbying. Some candidates may prefer to charge high prices and
appear interacting very rarely with the groups, while other candidates may prefer to charge
low prices and appear interacting more frequently with the groups.
For instance, assume candidate A commits to lobbying prices cA,a = 12
(√
5− 1) and
cA,b = 1 while candidate B commits to lobbying prices cB,b = 5
(√
5− 1) and cA,b = 10.
That is, while both pairs of announced prices satisfy the equilibrium ratio in Proposition 3.2,
group B charges 10 times more than group A both lobbyists. While either A or B winning
will be generating the same revenue, lobbying efforts in the two cases are not equal. In the




respectively, which yields a total lobbying effort of 1
2
(√
5− 1) . If candidate B wins, lobbying
effort exerted by groups a and b will be 1
10
(√
5− 2) and 1
20
(
3−√5) , respectively, the sum
of which is 1
20
(√
5− 1) . It is clear that the intensity of lobbying is greater in the first case.
Hence, the absolute values of the prices a candidate commits to charge depend on her own
views regarding lobbying. The more a candidate enjoys interacting with interest groups, the
lower prices she sets. On the contrary, a candidate that does not prefer to undergo lobbying
pressure sets higher lobbying prices as long as they satisfy the equilibrium ratio.
3.4 Asymmetric Candidates
In this section, we relax the assumption that the outcome of the election is determined
solely by the contributions of the groups and consider that it is also affected by the two
candidates’ skills, e.g., inherent attributes. We express this asymmetry between the two
candidates with the following assumption: in the election stage, if the two candidates exert
the same amount of effort, their probabilities of winning are not equal, but the more skilled




To simplify analysis, let us assume that whoever candidate wins the election commits to
charge to the opposite group lobbying price equal to 1. Hence, at the pricing stage, candidate
A and B have to determine only the lobbying price that they are going to charge to their
favourite group if they win, cA and cB, respectively. From eq. (3.5) and eq. (3.6), substituting
cI,j = 1, we have that the equilibrium lobbying efforts exerted by group i and j if candidate





















Without loss of generality, let us assume that the more skilled candidate is candidate A,
supported by group a. We denote candidate A’s advantage by δ > 1, by which we multiply








































Maximising the above expressions with respect to xa and xb, respectively, yields the following
result:
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Proposition 3.3. In the equilibrium of the asymmetric election stage game, groups a and b
offer contributions
x∗a =
δ (1− cAcB) [(cA + 2) cB + 1] 2 [cA (cB + 2) + 1]
(cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)




δ (1− cAcB) [(cA + 2) cB + 1] [cA (cB + 2) + 1] 2
(cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)
2 [δ (cA + 2) cB + cA (cB + 2) + δ + 1]
2 ,
respectively.












2 − 1 = 0
which yields the reaction function of group a
xa (xb) =
√
δ (cA + 1)
2xb (cB + 1)
2
[
1 + 2cB − cA (cA + 2) c2B
]
δ (cA + 1)





Similarly, for group b we have
δxa (1− cAcB) [cA (cB + 2) + 1]
(cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)
2 (δxa + xb)
2 − 1 = 0
which gives us its reaction function
xb (xa) =
√
δxa (cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)
2 (1− cAcB) [cA (cB + 2) + 1]
(cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)
2 − δxa.
Equating the two reaction functions to each other, we obtain the equilibrium contribution
levels in the proposition.
The second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum in the maximisation problem of
group a is
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2δ2xb (cAcB − 1) [(cA + 2) cB + 1]
(cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)
2 (δxa + xb)
3 < 0
and of group b
2δxa (cAcB − 1) [cA (cB + 2) + 1]
(cA + 1)
2 (cB + 1)
2 (δxa + xb)
3 < 0.
We can notice that both are satisfied when cAcB < 1.
Comparing the equilibrium contributions of Proposition 3.3 to each other and taking
into consideration the above second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum, cAcB < 1, we
obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1.
i) x∗a > x
∗
b if cA < 1 and cA < cB
ii) x∗b > x
∗
a if (cA ≤ 1 and cB < cA) or cA > 1
The above corollary provides us with some interesting information. Although candidate A,
and therefore group a, have an advantage over the opposing candidate and group, this does
not mean that group a always makes greater contribution than group b, as it is common in
contests. In fact, contributions also depend on the lobbying prices the two candidates have
committed to charge to the two groups if they win. Particularly, contribution by group a is
greater than the one by group b only if the lobbying price offered by candidate A is lower
than 1 as well as lower than the lobbying price offered by candidate B. Regarding group b,
it offers greater contribution if the lobbying price candidate B commits to charge is lower





Adding asymmetry to our model highly complicates the analysis of the first stage of the
game. Nevertheless, we are able to show graphically that an equilibrium exists and, using
numerical simulations, the equilibrium lobbying prices. Now, in contrast to the previous
section, because of the asymmetry in candidates’ abilities, their expected revenues are not
equal. Thus, we will study each candidate separately.
Regarding candidate A, she wants to set the optimal lobbying price to charge to her
favourite group in order to maximise her expected revenue. Therefore, making use of the






















2cA [δ (cA + 2) cB + δ]
(cA + 1)
2 [δ (cA + 2) cB + cA (cB + 2) + δ + 1]
}
.




2 (1− cA) [δ (cA + 2) cB + δ] 2 − 2δ
{
c2A (cB + 2) [(cA + 3) cB + 2] + cA − 2cB − 1
}
(cA + 1)
3 [δ (cA + 2) cB + cA (cB + 2) + δ + 1]
2 = 0.
Solving the above equation yields candidate A’s reaction function, cA (cB) , which is a quite
complicating expression. We can guarantee, though, through numerical simulations, that
candidate A’s optimal lobbying price is lower than 1 for every cB. This states that as in the
symmetric case, in the asymmetric case as well, candidate A will offer a lower lobbying price
to her favourite group than to the opposing one. The second-order sufficient condition for
a maximum is also satisfied in the optimal cA. We can also guarantee that candidate A’s
reaction function is increasing in cB, which indicates that candidate A always increases the
lobbying price she commits to as the opposite candidate increases her own (Figure 3.2).
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2cB [cA (cB + 2) + 1]
(cB + 1)
2 {cA [(δ + 1)cB + 2] + 2δcB + δ + 1}
}
.






1 + δ − cB (1 + δ + 4δcB)− c2A
[−4 + (1 + δ) c2B (3 + cB)]
−2cA
[−2− δ + cB + c2B (1 + 4δ + δcB)] }
(cB + 1)
3 {cA [(δ + 1) cB + 2] + 2δcB + δ + 1} 2
= 0
the solution of which yields candidate B’s reaction function. We can assure that, like cA, cB
cannot be greater than 1 either, meaning that the less skilled candidate also commits to a
lower lobbying price to her favourite candidate.
We, also, argue that cB is not always increasing in cA, but for large δ it can rather be
decreasing. We can observe this in Figure 3.2 focusing on candidate B’s reaction function for
any level of δ. The intuition behind it is that if the more skilled candidate is not sufficiently
skilled, the opposite candidate finds it optimal to respond with an increase in her lobbying
price to an increase in the more skilled candidate’s price. However, if the difference in skills is
sufficiently large, the less skilled candidate lowers the price as the more skilled one increases
it. She does so in order to induce her favourite group contribute more at the election stage
and, therefore, assist her to catch up the opponent’s high probability of winning because of
her skills. Moreover, we can notice that the more skilled the opposite candidate is, the lower
lobbying price the less skilled candidate commits to.
Equilibrium. Since the two candidates’ reaction functions are quite complicated expres-
sions, the solution of the system of them is complicated as well. In Figure 3.2, we plot the
candidates’ reaction functions for three different values of δ. It is clear that there is a unique
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equilibrium in pure strategies in each case, at the point where the two reaction curves inter-
sect. We can also notice that as δ goes up, the equilibrium moves to the upper left side of the
graph indicating that, in equilibrium, the more skilled a candidate is, the greater lobbying
price she charges to her favourite group and the lower price the opposite candidate charges
to her own favourite group.
(a) δ = 2 (b) δ = 5
(c) δ = 20
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium of the pricing stage game for different values of δ.
This observation can be validated in Figure 3.3 where we provide the graph of the two
candidates’ equilibrium lobbying prices as a function of δ. It becomes clear that the more
skilled candidate A is, the higher lobbying price she affords to commit to in equilibrium.
This occurs because in spite of the greater price her favourite group is likely to face at the
lobbying stage, it is not willing to decrease its contribution to her since the probability of
winning the election becomes greater because of the candidates’ skills. On the other hand,
as a candidate becomes more skilled, her opponent lowers the lobbying price she commits to
charge to her supportive group in order to deter it from being discouraged and decrease its
contribution to her.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium lobbying prices as a function of δ.
In Figure 3.4, we observe that the more skilled candidate’s expected lobbying revenue
is greater than her opponent’s. Also, starting from equal levels of revenue in the case
of symmetric candidates, as a candidate becomes more skilled, her opponent’s expected
lobbying revenue decreases and goes to zero for high levels of asymmetry.
Figure 3.4: Candidates’ expected lobbying revenues as a function of δ.
Interest groups
In what follows, we provide the analysis results regarding the two groups. In Figure 3.5,
we can notice that total lobbying effort is greater if the less skilled candidate wins since
the lower prices she has committed to facilitates the lobbying process. Thus, our model
predicts that a less skilled politician is more vulnerable to political pressure if she is elected.
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Moreover, this result is consistent to the concept of “informational lobbying”, where informed
lobbyists attempt to strategically transmit information to uninformed politicians (Calvert
1985, Austen-Smith & Wright 1992, Bennedsen & Feldmann 2002).
Figure 3.5: Total equilibrium lobbying effort as a function of δ. (e∗i : total equilibrium lobbying
effort if candidate i wins.)
In Figure 3.6, we can see that election contribution made by the group supporting the less
skilled candidate is slightly greater. This makes sense since offering greater contribution, the
group attempts to compensate for the opposite candidate’s advantage. Also, we can observe
that as the difference between the two candidates’ skills increases, contributions of both
groups tend to zero since the outcome of the election becomes foreseeable and potential
contributions by either group will not affect it significantly. The more skilled candidate does
not need any contributions since her advantage is already sufficiently strong because of her
skills and, thus, group a does not find it necessary to contribute. On the other hand, the
opposite candidate is at such an unfavourable position so that group b finds a potential
contribution futile.
Finally, Figure 3.7 gives us the expected payoffs of the groups as functions of candidate A’s
skills. Interestingly, we can notice that the group that supports the more skilled candidate
has a greater payoff but only slightly. Actually, for higher levels of δ, the expected payoffs
of two groups become equal. The intuition is that for low levels of asymmetry, greater
expected payoff of group a is attributed to candidate A’s higher probability of winning and
the relatively low lobbying price the group is going to pay. Nevertheless, for higher levels
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium election contributions as a function of δ.
of asymmetry, despite candidate A’s even greater probability of winning, the lobbying price
group a should pay is greater as well and as it approaches the price charged to the opposite
group, the payoffs of the two groups become equal.
Figure 3.7: Expected payoffs of the groups as a function of δ.
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analysed optimal lobbying pricing in a game with two candidates and
two interest groups. First, candidates commit to lobbying prices if they win the election.
Then, each group makes contribution to its favourite candidate in order to help her win
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the election. After the election, the two groups make lobbying efforts in order to affect the
incumbent politician’s policy.
We obtain, endogenously, that politicians commit to charge lower lobbying prices to the
groups that support them than to the opposite groups if they win the election. We also
show that the more skilled a politician is in the election, the greater the lobbying price she
commits to charge to her favourite group but not greater than the one she commits to charge
to the opposite group. This results establish the transaction between politicians and lobbies,
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Proof of Proposition 1.2

















q (p2 − λv2) f (v2) dv2
} (A.1)
Setting eq. (A.1) equal to zero, we get






(2− q) v2 − [1− (1− q)λ] p2
}
f (v2) dv2 +
∫ v∗2
0
q (p2 − λv2) f (v2) dv2
= p1 + [1 + (1− q)λ] p2 + q − 2− qλ
∫ v∗2
0







Substituting v∗2 from Proposition 1.1 to the above equation, we obtain




[1− F (v)] dv−
− qλ [1 + q + (λ− 1) q] p2




[1− F (v)] dv+
+ 2− q − (2− q) [1 + q + (λ− 1) q] p2
2 + (λ− 1) q
= p1 + [1 + (1− q)λ] p2 + qλ
∫ v∗2
0
[1− F (v)] dv − qλp2 [1 + q + (1− q)λ]






[1− F (v)] dv − (2− q) [1 + q + (1− q)λ] p2
2 + q (λ− 1)
= p1 + [1 + (1− q)λ] p2 − [1 + q + (1− q)λ] p2 + qλ
∫ v∗2
0






[1− F (v)] dv





[1− F (v)] dv + qλ
∫ v∗2
0
[1− F (v)] dv
which gives us the result in Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Firm’s maximisation problem is
max
p
E [pi] = E [S (p)]− E [U (p)] s.t. E [U ] = 0.
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q (p2 − λv2) f (v2) dv2
}
where substituting v∗1 from Proposition 1.2 and simplifying yields
∂S
∂v∗1
= f (v∗1) [2c− p1 − p2 − F (v∗2) (c− p2)] .
Regarding p1, we have that ∂v
∗






= f (v∗1) [2c− p1 − p2 − F (v∗2) (c− p2)] = 0. (A.2)

















f (v2) dv2 +
[1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2) (c− p2)
2 + (λ− 1) q
}
= [1− F (v∗1)]
{
qF (v∗2)− (1− q)λ [1− F (v∗2)] +
[1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2) (c− p2)
2 + (λ− 1) q
}
.
Moreover, we have already found in Section 1.3 that
∂v∗1
∂p2
= 1 + (λ− 1) q − [1 + λ− (λ− 1) q]F (v∗2) .
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1 + (λ− 1) q − [1 + λ− (λ− 1) q]F (v∗2)
}
+
+ [1− F (v∗1)]
{
qF (v∗2)− (1− q)λ [1− F (v∗2)] +
[1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2) (c− p2)




Solving eq. (A.2) for p1 and substituting to eq. (A.3), we have
[1− F (v∗1)]A
2 + (λ− 1) q = 0
whereA = [2 + (λ− 1) q]{ [q + (1− q)λ]F (v∗2)−(1− q)λ}+[1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2) (c− p2) .





whereB = [2 + (λ− 1) q]
{
[q + (1− q)λ]F (v∗2)−(1− q)λ
}
andD = [1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2) .
First, we show that D > 0. Assume that the opposite is true, D < 0. Then, since f (v∗2) > 0,
we have [1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2) < 0 =⇒ 1 +λ− (λ− 1) q < 0 =⇒ 1 +λ < (λ− 1) q =⇒
q > λ+1
λ−1 , which cannot be true since q ≤ 1. Regarding B, we have
B > [<] 0 =⇒ [2 + (λ− 1) q]
{
[q + (1− q)λ]F (v∗2)− (1− q)λ
}
> [<] 0
=⇒ [q + (1− q)λ]F (v∗2)− (1− q)λ > [<] 0, since 2 + (λ− 1) q > 0
=⇒ q{F (v∗2) + [1− F (v∗2)]λ} > [<] [1− F (v∗2)]λ
=⇒ q > [<] [1− F (v
∗
2)]λ
F (v∗2) + [1− F (v∗2)]λ
= q¯.
We have so far that, p2 = c+ BD , where D > 0 and B > [<] 0 if q > [<] q¯. Therefore, p2 > [<] c
if q > [<] q¯.
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Now, substituting eq. (A.4) to eq. (A.2) and after some algebra, we have
p1 = c+
[1− F (v∗2)] [2 + (λ− 1) q]
{
(1− q)λ− [q + (1− q)λ]F (v∗2)
}
[1 + λ− (λ− 1) q] f (v∗2)
or, equivalently,




Since 1− F (v∗2) > 0, D > 0 and B > [<] 0 if q > [<] q¯, we have that p1 < [>] c if q > q¯.
Non-loss-averse consumer
If consumer maximises her expected utility, she does not have any expectations about future
consumption or if she does, she does not take them into consideration when she decides
whether to buy or not. Thus, consumer buys second unit if her valuation in period 2 is












v1 − p1 +
∫ 1
p2
(v2 − p2) f (v2) dv2
]
f (v1) dv1.
Maximising the above expected utility with respect to v∗1, we get the optimal first-period
valuation threshold which is
v˜∗1 = p1 −
∫ 1
p2
[1− F (v)] dv.
When consumer decides whether to buy or not first unit, she only takes into consideration
the price of it and the probability of buying second unit which, in turn, depends on her
expected valuation in period 2 and the price of the second unit.















Following a similar process as in Section 1.3, we can find that the above expected social
surplus is maximised when p1 = p2 = c and p0 is equal to consumer surplus.
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Appendix B





















and because 0 < a ≤ 1 =⇒ 1
a
≥ 1, we have x∗1 ≥ x∗2.
For 0 < a ≤ 1, we have
E∗ (pi1)− E∗ (pi2) =
1
(1 + a)2















(1− c) (1 + c) (1− a) (1 + a)
(1 + c)2
≥ 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1] .
Thus, E∗ (pi1) ≥ E∗ (pi2) .
Proof of Proposition 2.2









=⇒ 4a ≤ (1 + a)2
=⇒ 1− 2a+ a2 ≥ 0
=⇒ (a− 1)2 ≥ 0,
85
which is true for all a.
Now we show that x¯ ≤ x∗1.









=⇒ (1 + a)2 ≤ 4
=⇒ 1 + a ≤ 2, since 1 + a > 0
=⇒ a ≤ 1,
which is true. Thus, x∗2 ≤ x¯ ≤ x∗1.
Now, we show that E∗ (pi2) ≤ E¯ (pi) .
E∗ (pi2) ≤ E¯ (pi) =⇒
1
(1 + a)2






=⇒ 3a2 + c2 + 2ac2 − 1− 2a− 3a2c2 ≤ 0
=⇒ 3a2 (1− c2)− 2a (1− c2)− (1− c2) ≥ 0
=⇒ (3a2 − 2a− 1) (1− c2) ≤ 0






1− c2) ≤ 0,
which is true since a− 1 ≤ 0 for 0 < a ≤ 1.
Finally, we prove that E¯ (pi) ≤ E∗ (pi1) :
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1 + a (2 + a) c2
(1 + c)2
=⇒ 3− 3c2 − 2a+ 2ac2 − a2 + a2c2 ≥ 0
=⇒ 3 (1− c2)− 2a (1− c2)− a2 (1− c2) ≥ 0
=⇒ − (a2 + 2a− 3) (1− c2) ≥ 0
=⇒ − (a− 1) (a+ 3) (1− c2) ≥ 0,
which is true since a− 1 ≤ 0 for 0 < a ≤ 1. Thus, E∗ (pi2) ≤ E¯ (pi) ≤ E∗ (pi1) .
In the following, we show that total effort in a contest with asymmetric first stage is


















































































= a ≤ 1,
which is true. Thus, easym ≥ esym.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. For 1
2
< a ≤ 1, we have
EL (pi1)− EF (pi2) =
1 + (4a− 1) c2
4a (1 + c)2
− (2a− 1)
2 + (4a− 1) c2
4a2 (1 + c)2
=
[a− (2a− 1)2] + [a (4a− 1)− (4a− 1)]c2
4a2 (1 + c)2
=
(
4a2 − 5a+ 1) (c2 − 1)
4a2 (1 + c)2
=
4 (a− 1) (a− 1
4
)
(c− 1) (c+ 1)
4a2 (1 + c)2







For 0 < a ≤ 1
2
, we have
EL (pi1)− EF (pi2) =






(1− a)− (1− a) c2
(1 + c)2
=
(1− a) (1− c2)
(1 + c)2
=
(1− a) (1− c)
(1 + c)







Thus, EL (pi1) ≥ EF (pi2) for 0 < a ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. For 0 < a ≤ 1, we have
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EL (pi2)− EF (pi1) =
a+ (4− a) c2
4 (1 + c)2
− (2− a)
2 + (4− a) ac2
4 (1 + c)2
=
(
a2 − 5a+ 4) c2 − (a2 − 5a+ 4)
4 (1 + c)2
=
(a− 4) (a− 1) (c− 1) (c+ 1)
4 (1 + c)2
≤ 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1] .
Thus, EL (pi2) ≤ EF (pi1) for 0 < a ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.8. i) We find the level of total effort when at the first stage,








































































Calculating the difference between e12 and esim, we obtain
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2a (1 + a)
1− c
1 + c




































The difference between e12 and esim is













(1 + a) (1− c)− (1− c)
(1 + a) (1 + c)
=
a (1− c)
(1 + a) (1 + c)







Thus, e12 ≥ esim for 0 < a ≤ 1.





































Subtracting esim from e21 yields
















2 (1 + a)
1− c
1 + c
≤ 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1] .
Thus, e21 ≤ esim for 0 < a ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. First we show that E∗ (pi1) ≤ EL (pi1) ≤ EF (pi1) , ∀a ∈ (0, 1] .
For 1
2
< a ≤ 1, we have
EL (pi1)− EF (pi1) =
1 + (4a− 1) c2
4a (1 + c)2
− (2− a)
2 + (4− a) ac2
4 (1 + c)2
=
(
c2 − 1) (a3 − 4a2 + 4a− 1)
4a (1 + c)2
=
(c− 1) (c+ 1) [a (a− 2)2 − 1]
4a (1 + c)2








EL (pi1)− E∗ (pi1) =
1 + (4a− 1) c2
4a (1 + c)2
− 1
(1 + a)2
1 + a (2 + a) c2
(1 + c)2
=
(1 + a)2 + (1 + a)2 (4a− 1) c2 − 4a− 4a2 (2 + a) c2
4a (1 + a)2 (1 + c)2
=
(
1− c2) (1− 2a+ a2)
4a (1 + c)2
=
(1− c) (1 + c) (1− a)2
4a (1 + c)2







For 0 < a ≤ 1
2
, we have
EL (pi1)− EF (pi1) =
(1− a) + ac2
(1 + c)2
− (2− a)
2 + (4− a) ac2




4 (1 + c)2
= −a (1− c) (1 + c)
4 (1 + c)2







EL (pi1)− E∗ (pi1) =




1 + a (2 + a) c2
(1 + c)2
=
a− a2 − a3 − ac2 + a2c2 + a3c2




a2 + a− 1)− (a2 + a− 1)]




c2 − 1) (a2 + a− 1)
(1 + a)2 (1 + c)2
= −a (1− c) (1 + c)
(
a2 + a− 1)
(1 + a)2 (1 + c)2






since a2 + a− 1 < 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1
2
]
. Thus, E∗ (pi1) ≤ EL (pi1) ≤ EF (pi1) for 0 < a < 1.
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Now, we show that player 2’s dominant strategy is to become a leader.
EL (pi2)− E∗ (pi2) =
a+ (4− a) c2
4 (1 + c)2
− 1
(1 + a)2
a2 + (1 + 2a) c2
(1 + c)2
=
a− 2a2 + a3 − ac2 + 2a2c2 − a3c2




1− 2a+ a2)− c2 (1− 2a+ a2)]
4 (1 + a)2 (1 + c)2
=
a (1− c) (a− 1)2
4 (1 + a)2 (1 + c)
≥ 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1] .
Also, for 1
2
< a ≤ 1, we have
EF (pi2)− E∗ (pi2) =
(2a− 1)2 + (4a− 1) c2
4a2 (1 + c)2
− 1
(1 + a)2
a2 + (1 + 2a) c2
(1 + c)2
=
1− 3a2 − 2a+ 4a3 − c2 + 2ac2 + 3a2c2 − 4a3c2
4a2 (1 + a)2 (1 + c)2
=
(
1− c2) (1− 3a2 − 2a+ 4a3)
4a2 (1 + a)2 (1 + c)2
= −(1− c) (1 + c) (1− a) [4 (a+ 1)− 1]
4 (1 + a)2 (1 + c)2






and for 0 < a ≤ 1
2
, we have





a2 + (1 + 2a) c2
(1 + c)2
=
−2ac2 − 3a2c2 − a2
(1 + a)2 (1 + c)2
= −a[c
2 (2 + 3a) + a]
(1 + a)2 (1 + c)2







Thus, EF (pi2) ≤ E∗ (pi2) ≤ EL (pi2) for 0 < a ≤ 1.
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Other proofs . We prove that player 2’s expected payoff is always higher when she chooses
effort xL2 < 1a
1−c
1+c




and EL2 (pi2) his expected payoff when she chooses effort xL2 ≥ 1a 1−c1+c . Then, we have
EL1 (pi2)− EL2 (pi2) =
a+ (4− a) c2
4 (1 + c)2
− (a− 1) + c
2
a (1 + c)2
=
a2 + (4− a) ac2 − 4 (a− 1)− 4c2
4a (1 + c)2
=
(
a2 − 4a+ 4) (1− c2)
4a (1 + c)2
=
(a− 2)2 (1− c)
4a (1 + c)
> 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1] ,
Thus, EL1 (pi2) > EL2 (pi2) , for 0 < a ≤ 1.
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Appendix C
Comparative statics of equilibrium contributions





















































































































since cI,jcJ,i > cI,icJ,j and, therefore, 2cI,jcJ,i > cI,icJ,j.































J,j − 2c3I,ic2J,icI,jcJ,j − 2c3I,icI,jc3J,j − c3I,icJ,icI,jc2J,j
−3c2I,ic3J,ic2I,j − 4c2I,ic2I,jc3J,j − 8c2I,icJ,ic2I,jc2J,j














)− 2c3I,icI,jc3J,j − c3I,icJ,icI,jc2J,j
−3c2I,ic3J,ic2I,j − 4c2I,ic2I,jc3J,j − 8c2I,icJ,ic2I,jc2J,j










since cI,icJ,j < cI,jcJ,i and, therefore, cI,icJ,j < 2cI,jcJ,i.



























Some manipulation of the above expression yields that
∂x∗i
∂cJ,j





























































Differentiation of expected revenue











2 > 0, ∀cI,i, cI,j, cJ,j, cJ,i










2 < 0, ∀cI,i, cI,j, cJ,j, cJ,i.


















































































cJ,j ≤ 3cJ,i2 and cI,j >
cI,i
(√
3cJ,icJ,j+c
2
J,i+3c
2
J,j+cJ,i+cJ,j
)
cJ,i+2cJ,j
)
or cJ,j >
3cJ,i
2
.
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